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Prior to 2006, New Zealand charged one of the highest rates of interest on student 
loans in the world; however, in line with the Labour government’s agenda to 
increase access to tertiary education, this was the year a blanket subsidy was 
applied to interest on all such loans. Literature theorising on the implications of 
introducing an interest-free arrangement of this nature suggests the policy is likely 
to exacerbate income inequality. This distributional effect is attributed to the 
consequent non-price rationing of scarce educational resources and, in the case of 
income-contingent repayments, the benefit is greater the wealthier the borrower. 
Changes in inequality owing to New Zealand’s education subsidy are examined 
from two aspects in this thesis. First, data from the New Zealand Income Survey 
(2002-2007), is analysed to determine the distributional effects on a subgroup of 
likely student loan holders relative to the total sample population. Propensity 
score and kernel matching techniques reveal that the subgroup of likely student 
loan holders have higher average incomes irrespective of the subsidy, which 
suggests the large subsidisation may in fact be an inefficient way to target income 
inequality.  
Second, public opinion regarding inequality in New Zealand is evaluated using 
data from the International Social Science Survey (1999 & 2009). OLS and probit 
regression models both suggest citizens would prefer to live in a society with less 
inequality; although, individuals from 2009 were less likely than those surveyed a 
decade earlier to believe it is the Government’s responsibility to intervene. This 
indicates a policy such as the blanket subsidy on student loan interest may not 
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The cost of tertiary education is shared between students and the New Zealand 
Government in order to facilitate participation, and exploit the private and public 
benefits of tertiary education (Wolfe, & Haveman, 2001). Private incentives to 
study include increasing human capital and obtaining higher permanent lifetime 
earnings, which lead to beneficial externalities of improved productivity, and 
various positive social outcomes including a lower prevalence of crime.  
Optimal spending on tertiary education involves a public contribution, the size of 
which depends on the extent of the social gains from education as illustrated in fig. 
1.1. Without government subsidisation a potential student would make their 
decision where marginal private benefit (MPB) equals marginal cost (MC), at a 
cost of P1 and a quantity Q1. This point represents an under-investment since 
higher level learning would be unaffordable for many potential students and 
society would miss out on the beneficial spill over effects those graduates would 
generate.  
The marginal social benefit curve (MSB) in fig. 1.1 represents the benefit to the 
individual as well as society. Where MSB intersects MC is the socially optimal 
point. Here education has a higher price, P2, and to incentivise consumption at the 
corresponding quantity, Q*, the government provides a subsidy of S1. With this 
appropriate government subsidy individuals pay a reduced price P3 and education 
resources can be allocated at the socially efficient level. However, the government 
could over-invest by providing a subsidy greater than S1, which would facilitate 
more education than what is justified by the return to society.  
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Figure 1.1 highlights the legitimate role for government intervention; and indeed, 
across the 70 countries that currently operate student loan schemes, most include 
an element of Government subsidisation, whereby students are not expected to 
repay the entire cost of their studies. It is, however, the methods and extent of 
such intervention which proves contentious (McPherson, 1991).  
 
 
Fig. 1.1: Theoretical effect of an education subsidy. 
 
One particularly popular method of government subsidisation initiated throughout 
student loan schemes worldwide is a ‘grace period’ (Woodhill, 1987). A grace 
period typically involves either the elimination of interest, or the elimination of 
repayment expectations for a specified period of time. This is often during study, 
or directly after, to allow graduates time to become financially stable. The 
extensive cost of implementing such a policy is justified by the contribution to 
greater equality (Levy, 2004).  
 
The level of contribution from the New Zealand Government has changed 
dramatically over the past three decades. In the 1980s the New Zealand 
Government was providing almost full subsidisation to individuals participating in 
tertiary study.  Often referred to as the ‘elite system’ this funding provided more 
or less free tertiary education, and universal student allowances (McLaughlin, 
2003). The growing interest in tertiary education meant the government could no 
longer justify this type of funding. This was replaced with a flat rate fee charged 
to students in 1990 which further fuelled demand for tertiary education and led to 
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the development of the Student Loan Scheme in 1992 (McLaughlin, 2003). 
Student loans are a funding mechanism whereby the government pays tertiary 
tuition fees, deferring the individual’s study costs until they are financially stable 
and can commence regular repayments. Originally, student loans bore interest at a 
market rate on completion of studies, with exclusions for borrowers facing 
particular hardships. 
The Labour Party’s surprising 2005 electoral promise to extend the interest1 write-
off to all student loans regardless of the borrower’s employment status appeared 
to be driven solely by political objectives and was indeed cited as the promise that 
won the Labour party another term (Baxter, 2012). The Labour party expected the 
scheme to increase tertiary education participation rates, reduce inequality, and 
allow individuals to pay off their debt faster (Beehive, 2006). Yet, it is unclear if 
this is the case, for it is unlikely that the effects will be a straightforward extension 
of the during-study interest write-off. Research in this area is limited but initial 
theoretical investigation finds some evidence that such a policy may in fact be 
detrimental to inequality (Barr, 2009). 
Theoretical analysis identifies two effects of a blanket subsidy that may result in a 
deepening of inequality (Barr, & Johnston, 2010). Firstly, the removal of financial 
barriers creates the need to ration scarce educational resources by non-monetary 
means. The use of an alternative mechanism, such as an academic requirement, is 
likely to disadvantage poorer potential students and worsen educational inequality 
since this group have lower academic outcomes. Secondly, the continuation of 
income-contingent repayments - where a set proportion of borrowers’ incomes is 
deducted - means monthly repayments will be of the same value ex ante subsidy, 
but the duration of the loan is reduced. This reduction is dependent on income 
where higher earning graduates will be debt free faster, exacerbating inequality.   
The high proportion of borrowers in New Zealand means these effects will be 
substantial, particularly as the proportion of borrowers has consistently increased 
since the introduction of this policy in early 2006 evident in fig. 1.2 (Education 
Counts, 2012c). With a higher number of borrowers the fiscal cost attributed to 
this subsidy is likely to increase. While it was very popular politically in 2005 it is 
unclear if the trade-off between equity and efficiency still adheres to public beliefs.      
                                                 
1







Fig. 1.2: Percentage of New Zealand population holding student loans from 
2002-2007. 
 
The implications for income inequality, from both non-price rationing, and 
extended loan duration for less well-off graduates, outlined in the literature thus 
far are solely founded on economic theory. In 2006 New Zealand became the first 
country to move from a high interest, to a no interest student loan scheme, 
providing a rare opportunity to investigate the outcome of such a policy change. 
Testing the distributional effects of New Zealand’s radical policy change offers 
the first chance to reconcile theory with empirics and is the focus of this thesis.   
 
1.2 Thesis Overview 
This thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the New Zealand 
Government’s current and historic financial contribution to tertiary education. 
Participation rates in tertiary education, loan statistics - including uptake of 
student loans - and total amount borrowed are presented to provide context on 
tertiary education, and show how demand for funding schemes has developed 
over the past few decades. In addition, a case study is presented which outlines 
how particular policy changes have manifested across different types of borrowers.  
Chapters 3 reviews the literature concerning the importance of funding tertiary 
education programs and the various subsidies introduced worldwide. Chapter 4 
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supports this by presenting the current student loan interest rates across multiple 
countries and the implications of these rates for repayment ratios.  
Chapter 5 uses data from the New Zealand Income Survey (2002-2007) to 
empirically test the income and inequality outcomes of this policy on a group of 
likely student loan holders. A general picture of inequality will be presented and 
disaggregated subgroup effects will be presented alongside global effects.  
Chapter 6 analyses changes in attitudes towards inequality using International 
Social Science Surveys from 1999 and 2009. Both OLS regressions and ordered 
probit results are used to identify if individuals in 2009 valued higher equality, a 














New Zealand’s public expenditure on tertiary education against similar countries 
provides a context of tertiary education spending levels over the last decade. This 
is presented at the start of this chapter to set up how recent changes to the student 
loan scheme have likely impacted this spending. In addition a case study 
highlighting the potential magnitude of the decision to apply a blanket interest rate 
subsidy on all student loans in 2006 will conclude this chapter.  
 
2.2 Public Expenditure on Tertiary Education 
The extent to which the Government provides financial support to students has 
become particularly topical in New Zealand, as the country has seen the 4
th
 
highest increase in public expenditure in tertiary education across the OECD 
countries from 2000 to 2010. This translates to financial aid to tertiary students at 
a level of almost double that of the OECD average. This investment represents a 
significant trade-off at the expense of other policy areas, particularly in light of 
the fiscal stress caused by the global financial crisis (Treasury, 2012a; 
Vossensteyn, 2004).  
Analysing public tertiary expenditure per student as a percentage of GDP per 
capita (Fig. 2.1) shows that New Zealand spent a larger percentage of GDP per 
capita on tertiary education per student than Australia, USA, and OECD countries 
from 1998 to 2010
2
. In New Zealand this spending is inclusive of financial aid to 
students, and institutional funding. Financial aid to students includes student loans, 
                                                 
2
 (with the exception of OECD countries in 2006). 
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interest subsidies, allowances, and public subsidies including housing and medical 
expenses.  
Looking specifically at the trends for New Zealand public spending on tertiary 
education was decreasing from 1999 to 2005. This trend was replaced with a 
significant increase in public tertiary spending from 2005-2010.  A 25 percent 
increase occurred from 2005-2010, with an 8 percent and 10 percent increase 
occurring between 2006-2007 and 2008-2009, respectively. Both of these 









Fig. 2.1: Expenditure per student, tertiary (% of GDP per capita) 1998-2010 (The 
World Bank, 2014). 
 
2.3 New Zealand’s Student Loan Scheme 
The New Zealand Government implemented widespread policy reforms in the 
1980s in order to stimulate economic productivity and increase social equity. 
Increasing educational attainment was recognised as a means to achieve these 
goals, and the tertiary education sector was targeted as a catalyst. Increased 
participation in tertiary education in the 1980s created the need for mass tertiary 
education policies rather than the previously highly subsidised and targeted 
system that had much lower rates of participation.  
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The Ad Hoc Cabinet Committee on Education and Training was created in 1987. 
This committee produced a booklet for the New Zealand Government highlighting 
the benefits of higher participation in tertiary education. The issue of income 
support was raised due to the significant trade-off between mass participation and 
the high subsidisation of incomes which was currently in operation. This, coupled 
with a previous report from the Department of Education (1978), encouraged the 
Government to create the Working Group on Post Compulsory Education and 
Training (PCET) in 1988. 
Recommendations from PCET and other departments led to the abolition of 
effectively free tertiary education, and universal student allowances in 1990. A 
system of user pays was introduced where a standard flat rate of fees was charged 
to students. A quasi-market for tertiary education was effectively created to 
promote economic competiveness and increase the range of higher education 
providers. Increasing the number of higher education provides enables higher 
participation and effectively should act to reduce educational inequality.  
However, the introduction of a flat rate fee to all tertiary education participants 
likely created a positional advantage for those from wealthier backgrounds, as 
wealthier families could afford to pay the flat rate fee. Therefore, although higher 
participation should act to reduce inequality the outcome of the introduction of the 
flat rate fee contradicts this. Thus, the prevailing impact on inequality becomes 
much more complex that theoretically predicted.  
The removal of more or less free tertiary education and the introduction of a flat-
rate fee created the need for some students to obtain financial support. While 
loans were available from the private sector, the absence of collateral for most 
students, and the increased risk of default associated with this type of borrowing 
created additional barriers. The National Government decided to develop and 
implement a loan scheme targeted solely at students in 1992. This scheme was 
introduced to provide loans to tertiary students in order to facilitate participation 
by all. It provided both tuition fees and education-related costs at more generous 
rates than that available from the private finance sector. Loans were income-
contingent which meant no repayments were required until the recipients earned a 
sufficient level of income ($12,670). The Student Loan Scheme was initiated and 
managed by the Ministry of Education. 
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Since its initiation, the Student Loan Scheme has undergone significant changes. 
The Ministry of Education recently published the key policy changes the student 
loan scheme has undergone during the period 1992-2012 and 15 major changes 
were listed. These included:  
 In 1993 the academic requirement stating the recipient had to have passed 
at least half of their prior two years of tertiary study was abolished until 
2011 when this was reintroduced.  
 In 1997 the amount individuals could borrow for living costs was adjusted.  
 1999 saw numerous changes which included a change in how the 
payments were made, parental consent becoming mandatory for any 
borrower under the age of 18, and restrictions were placed on what 
borrowing could be used for (Education Counts, 2013b; New Zealand 
Parliament, 2013).  
 In 2000 the first changes were made to the interest rates. A full blanket 
interest rate subsidy during-study was introduced. This blanket interest 
rate subsidy expired upon a borrowers exit from study and the standard 
interest rate of 7% was charged (Peterson, 1999).  
 Following this in 2001 interest-setting mechanisms were established.  
 In 2006 this interest blanket subsidy was extended to include all borrowers 
out of study who permanently reside in New Zealand. This is the focus of 
this research.  
 A three-year repayment holiday where borrowers were exempt from all 
payment obligations was introduced in 2007 for overseas borrowers, 
however in 2012 this was reduced to only one year.  
 In 2009 the living costs component of the loan became indexed to inflation 
and in 2011 a life-time borrowing limit was introduced (Education Counts, 
2013a). 
 
The latter changes to the student loan scheme are likely to be the most significant 
as the total number of borrowers and the total amount borrowed continues to 











Fig. 2.2: Total loan borrowings by year (CPI adjusted3)  
 
   
  






Fig. 2.3: Percentage of total student loan borrowers 
 
2.4 Case Study  
 
The Labour Government’s decision in 2006 to remove interest from all student 
loans has largely reduced the debt burden of borrowers, and consequently reduced 
the length of repayments. How these effects occur can be shown empirically by 
considering an example of borrowers who took out loans in 1995.  
                                                 
3
 Base year 2006 Q2 
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To calculate the average repayment time, it is assumed that all 42,735 new 
borrowers take out the average loan amount each year during study, study for 
average three years, make no repayments during this study period, then earn the 
average graduate salary each subsequent year meeting the minimum 10% 
repayment obligation only. (Education Counts, 2005). The average repayment 
period can then be calculated by determining the remaining loan value in each 
year: 
                                                                                                      
                                                                                             
                                                                                              
Where:      Value of student loan balance – year one 
                     Initial loan value 
                     Student loan interest rate 
                   Value of student loan balance – year two 
                    Value in year two  
                   Value of student loan balance – year three 
                    Value in year three 
 
After the first three years of study the remaining size of the loan each year can be 
calculated using: 
                                     [   (         )]                                              
Where:     Value of student loan balance 
                    Current loan value 
                  Graduate salary 
                  Repayment threshold 
                  Student loan interest rate 
 
Once     and the loan is no longer outstanding, the total repayment time can be 
calculated using the final year payments were made and the initial year the loan 
was withdrawn.  
                                                                                                                               
Where: 
  Repayment period 
    Final year payments were made 




Using these formulae, average repayment times can be calculated to compare 
expected loan lifetimes before, and after, the introduction of the interest free 
policy. Assuming the ex-ante interest rate of 7 percent per annum continued in the 
counterfactual instance, an average borrower in 1998 would repay their debt in 
just less than 14 years; whereas, having not accrued any interest post 2006, their 
loan would be repaid six months sooner as is outlined below. 
Table 2.1 
Repayment Time Comparison with Blanket Interest Subsidy 
  Interest  Interest-free 
Age  22 22 
Total borrowers 42,735 42,735 
Loan balance after 3 years study $17,063 $17,063 
Average graduate salary $27,194 $27,194 
Loan value after 5 years $14,032 $14,032 
Loan value after 10 years $6606 $5624 
Repayment time 13.96 years 13.43 years 
 
 
The removal of interest from 2006 resulted in the average borrower owing $1084 
less, which sums to almost $55 million across all borrowers initiating loans in 
1995. However, this is likely to be an over-estimate since the reduction in loan 
lifetime only holds when a graduate’s earnings are above the repayment threshold.  
The impact of this over-estimation can be examined by comparing the difference 
in loan duration between the student loan repayments made by a graduate who 
earns the average graduate salary, and a low earning graduate. Figure 2.4 shows 
the repayments schedule for the median loan value in 2008 ($19,255) for an 
average graduate. The average age of students starting tertiary study is 22, and the 
average time spent in tertiary education is 3 years. After the three years within 
study, the average graduate starts on a salary of $38,082 (Career NZ, 2012) and 
begins repayments of 12 cents (post 2012) in the dollar above the threshold of 
$19,080. Using equations 2.1 and 2.2, the average graduate will start making 
repayments at the age of 25 and will finish paying off their student loan at the age 
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of 30 based on the aforementioned assumptions. As it can be seen in fig. 2.4 the 
total crown cost rises over the loan duration as interest accrues on their loan, and 
the student loan balance falls proportionate to the repayment increasing as the 





















Fig. 2.5. Case study of a low earning graduate in 2012. 
 
The projected case of a low earning graduate, presented in fig. 2.5, highlights the 
significance of a borrower’s income in determining both the length of the loan and 
the cost to the crown. The main impact of non-repayment or low repayment is that 
the duration of the loan remains similar to the situation before the introduction of 
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the interest free policy. This increases inequality between the higher earning and 
lower earning graduates, since the latter carry the debt burden for a longer time.  
Non-repayment due to a sufficiently low income occurred for approximately 50 
percent of borrowers within the student loan scheme in 2006 for at least one year, 
while a further 26% of those borrowers made no repayments in the first three 
years post study. This is modelled in fig. 2.5 by the low earning graduate making 
no repayments until the age of 29 (Hyatt, Keenan, & Smyth, 2012). Assuming at 
the age of 29 this individual obtains a job with a salary of $21,988, which 
represents the average salary for a hospitality graduate (Careers NZ, 2012), the 
forecast repayment time for this individual is 16 years.  
These case studies highlight the significant role a graduate’s income plays in 
determining the implications of the introduction of zero interest on student loans 
in 2006. Therefore, investigation into the distributional impacts of this policy 
using empirical data would highlight the extent to which these effects are 














In this chapter motivations for the adoption of a cost sharing approach between 
governments and individuals, facilitating participation in tertiary education are 
outlined.  The theoretical implications of government funding in the form of a 
blanket interest subsidy will then be presented, and the particular implications of 
this subsidy occurring within an income-contingent based repayment framework. 
The responsiveness of student demand to price changes will add to the potential 
implications and magnitude of the blanket interest subsidy decision. Finally, the 
relationship between education and inequality will be presented. This is 
supplemented by results from New Zealand outlining the implications for 
inequality of past educational policy changes.    
 
3.2 The Importance of Funding Higher Education 
 
Investment in tertiary education is being seen as more and more of a necessity as 
the world shifts towards technologies which require workers who have a higher 
skill set (Ashton, 1996). Additionally, higher education facilitates the creation of 
human capital which increases labour market earnings and reduces unemployment. 
Higher human capital has also been linked to lower crime rates and health benefits 
which all contribute positively to economic growth and societal prosperity 
(Canton et al., 2001). This trend in public perception has pushed for governments 
to increase access to tertiary education in order for its citizens to compete globally 
(Goedegebuure, Santiago, Fitznor, Stensaker, & Van Der Steen, 2008).  
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One option available which can increase access to tertiary education is the 
subsidisation of educational funding. However, the funding of higher education is 
a complex and highly debated topic due to the high fiscal cost associated with 
funding schemes. This has created an impetus for Government to shift to market-
based education policies which involves a higher private contribution to higher 
education, and the introduction of approaches based on cost-sharing. This is 
largely due to the unsustainability of free provision when there is higher 
participation, but also due to the higher private returns of tertiary qualifications 
and the regressive nature of free provision. Furthermore, it has been shown 
students are more likely to make better informed decisions if the financial burden 
ultimately falls on the individual (Vossensteyn, 2004). The existence of both 
private and public costs and benefits generates debate over how much of the cost 
should come from individuals versus how much should be borne by the 
Government.  
The provision of educational funding by Governments is typically justified by two 
main objectives. Firstly, by offering a loan rather than a pay-out, and cost-share 
with borrowers, the cost to the government is greatly reduced. In addition, it also 
allows time for borrowers to become financially stable before initiating 
repayments. This reduces the debt burden for unemployed or low earning 
graduates and takes away the risk associated with withdrawing a loan. Secondly, 
by increasing participation by lower income groups this is likely to improve 
education equality.   
In New Zealand, these objectives are communicated through the Tertiary 
Education Strategy (TES) which was established in 2002 and implemented by the 
Tertiary Education Commission (TEC) established in 2003. In the most recent 
TES (2010-2015) the main focus was to increase access to world-class skills for 
New Zealanders from all backgrounds, which is an explicit commitment to 
increasing equality of access. This would raise the skill level of the current and 
future work force in order to meet the labour demand and increase the knowledge 
base of New Zealanders. 
Within the TES a cost-sharing approach was proposed which involves 
Government funding as a way to achieve these outcomes while being clear about 
the fiscal trade-off. This subsidisation should only equate to the marginal external 
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benefit received by the Government (fig. 1.1) and encourage participation at Q* a 
point beyond where the free market would operate with no subsidisation. Policies 
are then implemented by the TEC and are required to have a report on the returns 
generated by the investment in the long-run. The table featured below specifies 
the private and social costs and benefits of participation in higher education. The 
ability to quantify some of the costs and benefits further adds to the complexity 
regarding the most efficient level of Government provision.   
 Table 3.1  
The Private and Social Costs and Benefits of Higher Education  
 Private Social 
Costs   Tuition, fees and study 
materials 
 Operating costs of 
programs  
  Forgone earnings  Student support 
   Forgone national 




 Higher productivity and 
thus higher net earnings 
 Higher national 
productivity 
  Better job opportunities  Higher tax revenues  
  Higher savings   Greater flexibility in 
labour force 
  Personal and professional 
mobility 
 Higher consumption 





 Educational enrichment  Social cohesion, 
appreciation of social 
diversity and cultural 
heritage 
  Better labour conditions  Higher social mobility 
  Higher personal status  Lower crime rates 
  Higher job satisfaction  More donations and 
charity work 
  Better health and life 
expectancies 
 Increased capacity to 
adapt to new technologies 
  Improved spending 
decisions 
 Higher social/political 
participation  
  More hobbies and value 
of leisure activities 
 
  Personal development  
Source: Vossensteyn, 2004   
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3.3 Blanket Subsidy changes 
The Government’s contribution towards the cost-sharing approach to tertiary 
education dramatically changed when a blanket interest subsidy was introduced 
onto student loans in New Zealand in 2006. This was the first time a Government 
policy aimed at increasing access to tertiary education was not targeted at those 
solely with financial hardship. This surprising decision by the soon to be in power 
Labour party was very popular politically. However, the economic and social 
implications of blanket subsidies remain much less clear.    
Limited research has been enacted in this area however, theoretical implications 
have been presented regarding the potential impacts. Professor Nicholas Barr of 
the LSE has specialised in research which looks at the possible effects of 
introducing a blanket subsidy specifically in the education market. Barr’s (2012) 
findings do not debate that this type of policy will have a positive impact on 
educational access through lowering the barriers to entry, however, it is more 
likely this type of scheme will increase income inequality overall.  
Two reasons are proposed for this increase in inequality. Firstly, universities 
becoming forced to ration scarce educational resources across more students when 
credit is not an obstacle, and thus, universities have to find a different 
discriminatory criterion. This creates an opportunity for universities to ‘cherry 
pick’ their students based on educational standards which has previously not 
occurred in New Zealand (Barr, 1989, 2002, 2003, 2009, 2012). This restriction 
coupled with new performance based measures of assessment makes ‘cream 
skimming’ or ‘cherry picking’ of students most likely to harm those from low-
income backgrounds as it is widely believed that these individuals will have lower 
educational outcomes  (Blanden & Gregg, 2004; Van Thiel, & Leeuw, 2002).   
Secondly, the continuation of income-contingent repayments - where a set 
proportion of borrowers’ incomes is deducted -means monthly repayments will be 
of the same value ex ante subsidy, but the duration of the loan is reduced. This 
reduction is dependent on income where higher earning graduates will be debt 
free faster, exacerbating inequality.  Low earning or unemployed graduates will 
make no repayments and the length of their indebtedness will remain unchanged 
whilst their earnings are low, and widen the discrepancy in graduate incomes. 
Further, the clause forgiving borrowers of their debts upon death means the 
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repayment length of any consistently low earning, or unemployed, graduate will 
remain unchanged as they are likely to carry their student loan debt until death 
(Barr, 1989, 2002, 2003, 2009, 2012).  
It is these potentially regressive impacts which make the additional cost 
experienced by the government unjustified. The offering of a lower rate of interest 
is effectively the same as handing out grants as governments never receive 
compensation  
Barr’s work shed light on some of the additional unintended consequences of 
blanket subsidies in the student loan market such as the additional cost 
experienced by the Government. In the UK it has been calculated that as much as 
30-35 cents of every dollar borrowed is lost purely because of the current 
Government subsidisation in the student loan market
4
. This number is almost 
equivalent in New Zealand with the Treasury predicting a total loss of 45 cents in 
every dollar, of which 73% can be attributed to the interest free policy (Treasury, 
2012b).  
“One of the most expensive examples of unintended policy 
       consequences in New Zealand’s modern history” 
 
       Professor Tim Hazledine (2013).  
This cost can be shown empirically using an average borrower’s loan in 2008 and 
the average discount rate of crown lending estimated as 6.26% (Parliament, 2012). 
This discount rate represents the full cost of lending and a risk adjusted value for 
the average loan balance across a borrower’s repayment term with no repayments. 
Calculating the cost to the crown of offering an average borrower the median 
student loan amount in 2008 ($19,255) with zero interest can then be calculated 
by: 
                                                                                                                           
 
Where:     Cost to the Crown 
                    Initial loan size 
                   Discount rate (6.26%) 
 
                                                 
4
 Estimated by Barr using UK statistics  
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The discounted difference between the cost to the crown and the repayments made 
by the graduate represent the net present value of the student loan policy with zero 
interest accruing to the borrower.  This area can be calculated using the net 
present value formula and then taking the difference: 
                                         
Where:                                            
                                                 ∑
  
      
 
                                                                   
 
Where:     Net cash flow  
                 Discount rate  
                 Time of the cash flow 
 
The net present value of an average borrower’s loan withdrawn in 2008 and paid 
off in 2016 is $72,706.83 using a 4% discount rate. This equates to a loss of 61 
cent in every dollar lent. This differs from the prediction made by Treasury but 
both examples highlight a significant loss to the Government due to the interest 
free policy. However, this is as far as the literature extends in terms of direct 
before and after comparisons. Boston, Dalziel, and John (1999) point out that the 
gap between theoretical predictions of policy outcomes and empirical real world 
outcomes is not an issue restricted to the student loan policy area. They claim no 
New Zealand social policy initiative since the 1980s has been effectively 
evaluated post facto. This raises the importance of looking at the empirical effects 
of the introduction of policy, for example the impacts of the introduction of 
interest free student loans in 2006.  
 
Although no specific study has linked educational outcomes and inequality 
impacts to the interest free policy decision, annual educational outcomes have 
been recorded by educational and external organisations. According to results 
produced by the OECD, (based on 2008 data) New Zealand has one of the highest 
participation rates for tertiary education on average. This is particularly interesting 
as this was one of the primary drivers the Labour government gave for making 
student loans interest free. Additional results from this report also list ‘entry rate’ 
indicators for New Zealand, where entry rate is defined as the first time an 
individual enters tertiary education. These indicators show New Zealand has a 
 21 
 
large number of older students choosing to participate in tertiary studies with over 
half (68%) of all first entrants to tertiary study aged between 20 and 27 (Scott, & 
Gini, 2010). This is interesting as typically older students make better financial 
choices than their younger counterparts and may require less assistance (Davies, 
& Williams, 2001).    
 
3.4 Income Contingent Loans   
The theoretical impacts of interest free student loans are also dependent on how 
interest rates are manifested within the structure of the repayment scheme. There 
are two main types of student loans. Firstly, fixed schedule loans where an annual 
rate of interest is set, monthly payments are specified and there is a repayment 
period within which the individual must pay back the loan. Secondly, income 
contingent loans, where individuals are required to pay some proportion of future 
earnings at a fixed contractual rate of interest until the loan is paid or some 
predetermined time frame or amount has been reached. Australia was the first 
country to introduce an income contingent loan repayment scheme in 1989. New 
Zealand was the second country to adopt this type of scheme in 1992 and this was 
then followed by the UK, Sweden, Scotland and South Africa (Johnstone, 2005).    
Chapman and Greenaway (2006) point out the advantages of income-contingent 
loans (ICL) which have implications for inequality. Firstly, it is likely a universal 
ICL scheme will decrease the possibility individuals will miss out due to unequal 
intra-family sharing compared with a mean-based tested scheme. This is because 
an individual’s entry into the scheme is not restricted by parental willingness to 
help. Secondly, default rates should effectively be low if the repayments are 
collected through the tax system which reduces the financial burden on the 
Government. Finally, because they are based on the premise of the individual 
receiving a set amount of income, being unable to pay due to financial hardship 
should not be a problem. It is this last advantage that has particular implication for 
the uptake of loans by lower socio economic groups as it reduces the uncertainty 
associated with investment in higher education.   
While the introduction of an ICL scheme has likely had a positive overall impact 
on equality it is because of this type of repayment scheme that the introduction of 
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interest free student loans in 2006 has likely had a regressive impact on equality.  
This is since Government subsidisation did not alter the amount of monthly 
repayments for the student loan holders simply the duration of the loan. This 
subsidy is therefore, only likely to help those financially well-off graduates who 
are able to repay their loans in a shorter timeframe. This does not help graduates 
while their incomes are low due to the confines of the repayment schedule. 
Additionally, any low earning or unemployed graduate is unlikely to afford the 
monthly repayments for example, in the 2009 tax year 52% of borrowers made no 
repayments and as such the duration of their loan remained unchanged (Ministry 
of Education, 2012).  
 
3.5 Student Demand  
Funding schemes are directly related to price i.e. if the price of tuition increases 
the amount of funding needed to cover this expense also increases. Therefore, 
expanding and equalizing the opportunity for individuals to undertake higher 
education is not only dependent on funding schemes but also largely dependent on 
manipulations of price. This is supported by economic theory which suggests that 
students demand for education will be responsive to prices changes. If the cost of 
education increases i.e. an increase in the fees this increases the cost of studying 
and the cost for some students will become too high, and this will lead those 
individuals to choose not to participate in study. Therefore, the introduction of the 
blanket subsidy in New Zealand, which reduces the cost of obtaining a loan to 
cover educational costs should, according to economic theory, result in higher 
enrolments. The magnitude of this effect is also dependent on the responsiveness 
of student demand to price. There has been significant research into estimating the 
responsiveness of student demand for education to variations in the price. The 
most common methodology involves estimating tuition elasticity using the 
income elasticity of demand.   
                                        |  |  
             
              




No general consensus has been established in terms of an exact value for the 
elasticity of demand for education. However, in a comprehensive but dated review 
of 25 student demand studies the most common value of price elasticity of 
demand was found to be -0.24 (Leslie, & Brinkman, 1987).  This result is 
particularly interesting as it suggests an inelastic relationship for example, an 
increase in price by 1% will only decrease the demand by 0.24%.  
However, this study does not look at how the responsiveness differs across 
different socio-economic backgrounds (Leslie, & Brinkman, 1987). This factor 
alone has been shown to have a profound effect on the responsiveness of demand 
to price.  In particular, students from a low income family, or who have 
uneducated parents have a much higher elasticity of demand towards higher 
education than those from higher income families. This is important as these traits 
have been defined as influential in the determination of enrolments (Bishop, 1977). 
The implications of discounting higher education by removing interest for all 
student loan holders is likely to be manifested within changes to low socio-
economic group enrolments, where the responsiveness to demand is the highest.   
 
3.6 Inequality and Education 
 
New Zealand, along with many other developed nations, regards education as a 
way to reduce social inequality (Gregorio, & Lee, 2002). Higher education 
increases human capital and knowledge, which in turn creates higher returns to 
labour which affords the individual increased opportunities. Increasing access to 
higher education to all, therefore, increases the amount of people who can 
command a higher income and as such, should reduce inequality. This promotes 
social mobility and equalises opportunities across society (Bacchi, 2009). 
However, this assumes a world with no scarcity or necessary rationing of 
educational resources.  
 
Psacharopoulos (1977) pointed out why free education, or in the case of the 
interest blanket subsidy, heavily discounted education, could in fact disadvantage 
those from lower socio economic backgrounds, and result in increased inequality. 
The rationale explains that free or discounted education must then be rationed by 
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an additional non-price mechanism and it is this mechanism that typically 
disadvantages those from lower socio-economic backgrounds. The academic 
requirement to enter university is one such example of a rationing mechanism. It 
has been shown that an individual’s academic outcomes were one of the highest 
predictors of entrance into higher education (Strathdee, 2003). However, this is 
likely to negatively impact inequality as individuals from wealthier backgrounds 
have the means to support private preparation in order to ensure a place at a 
tertiary education provider, while those from lower socio economic backgrounds 
are more likely to miss out. Therefore even though lower socio-economic groups 
are more likely to have the highest demand response to changes in price this is 
under the assumption these individuals are not further restricted by rationing of 
educational places.   
 
It must; be noted however, that both of these works were based on countries such 
as America and the UK where entrance exams to universities are compulsory and 
the reputation of the university plays a significant role in the returns to the human 
capital an individual receives. Owing to New Zealand’s small population, places 
at the main universities are not quite as constrained, and there is a simple 
academic requirement based on school performance rather than an additional 
exam. Furthermore, results from a study undertaken by Strathdee (2011) indicated 
that it was not where one studied in New Zealand that made the major difference 
for future prospects, it was primarily the course of study chosen which influenced 
the opportunities available post-study. This suggests a gap in the literature exists 
where findings from New Zealand may provide valid insights to supplement 
theoretical predictions.  
 
Psacharopoulo’s (1977) research also showed that not only is indiscriminate 
subsidisation, such as the blanket subsidy on interest rates, likely to increase 
inequality it is also likely to be highly inefficient. This is because investment into 
tertiary education has the lowest rate of return when compared to primary and 
secondary due to the high private benefit associated with tertiary education. 
Therefore, while it would be more productive for Governments to increase 
investment in the primary or secondary sector it is becoming an ever increasing 
trend in society for Government’s to fund higher educational opportunities 
































Australia Ireland New Zealand OECD average United Kingdom United States
almost double the expenditure on tertiary education than primary or early 
childhood education.  
 
Fig. 3.1. Per student annual expenditure to educational institutions for selected 
OECD countries (2006). Source: Ministry of Education, 2009.   
 
Therefore, efficiently targeting a reduction in inequality by increasing access to 
tertiary education is a complex objective if resources are scarce. Although 
education is widely accepted as a social equaliser where inequality can be reduced 
simply by increasing access to educational services and ensuring the quality of 
educational outcomes is high, this type of conclusion is devoid of the implications 
of scarce educational resources. Once the financial barriers are removed or 
decreased like that of the interest free student loan policy, demand for higher 
education increases, and educational facilities are forced to ration places. 
Educational institutions then become a type of oppressor towards lower socio-
economic groups and this is likely to negatively impact inequality (Bacchi, 2009).  
 
3.7 Results from New Zealand 
 
New Zealand has undergone significant educational policy reforms since the 
1980s and this provides an opportunity to identify how these previous reforms 
have impacted inequality and how these changes have been manifested. Research 
spanning from 1983 to 2001 in New Zealand revealed that individuals from a 
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middle class background were benefitting the most from the previous educational 
reforms, with the highest increase in participation in higher education. Richer 
individuals who were the most harmed by the reforms, (as previously this subset 
of the population were the most likely to be receiving the free tertiary subsidies), 
still had the highest rates of participation across all the groups, while poorer 
individuals participation remained relatively unchanged during this time. This 
result was particularly interesting as increased participation by poorer individuals 
was a key motivation for the reforms yet this may have been due to educational 
facilities rationing their places (Strathdee, 2003). 
 
Following the 1990’s reforms the Government formed both the TES and the TEC 
in 2002 as aforementioned. This lead to the introduction of a number of policies 
aimed at reducing inequality. The introduction of the interest write-off for student 
during study in 2000 embodied this objective. Incomes of students during study 
are typically low, and by offering of an interest write-off to this group effectively 
provides a grant to lower income individuals which increases equality (Levy, 
2004).  
 
Interestingly, it was also the TEC who supported the Labour Government decision 
to extend this interest write-off in 2006 to all borrowers regardless of occupation. 
The primary justification for the introduction of this policy was to increase access 
to tertiary education, reduce inequality and allow individuals to pay off their debt 
faster (Beehive, 2006). While the interest-write off during study is attributed to 
positive equity gains, it is unclear if the extension of this policy to all borrowers 














Student loans are one example of a market-type mechanism which facilitates 
participation in higher education. Student loans have been implemented in more 
than 70 countries around the world. Student loan mechanisms differ vastly among 
countries, however, the majority of student loan schemes offer funding towards 
either the cost to the institution, or other educationally-related expenses 
(Johnstone, 2009). This type of cost-sharing defers the payment for higher 
education until a future period when repayments are made (Johnstone, & 
Marcucci, 2009).  This chapter provides a comparison of student loan interest 
rates worldwide and the subsequent implication of these interest rates for 
repayment rations.  
Typically student loans are provided by the Government due to a low financial 
incentive for private companies to put forth funds. This is primarily due to the 
high risk of default and absence of collateral by student loan borrowers. These 
considerable risks would lead to the free market interest rates on student loans 
becoming increasingly high without Government intervention (Johnstone, 2005).  
Repayment of student loans is reliant on the type of loan structure and the 
associated interest rate. Although it is not uncommon for countries to charge a 
zero rate of interest, the decision made by the New Zealand Government to move 
from a real rate of interest (i.e. adjusted for inflation) of 6.9% to zero nominal rate 
was the first of its kind. Interest rates vary greatly across different countries and 
are listed below. Where possible, only loans which were most in line with New 
Zealand’s Student Loan Scheme are listed rather than loans which were more 
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equivalent to the Student Allowance Scheme in New Zealand (The International 
Comparative Higher Education Finance and Accessibility Project, 2009). 
 Table 4.1  
Student Loan Interest Rates Worldwide 
Country Rate of interest 
Australia Zero real rate – indexed to the CPI 
Brazil Ranges between 3.5%-5.5% 






 Set by the People’s Bank of China 
Colombia 1% 
Denmark 4% during study, then the discount rate of the Danish Central Bank 
plus an adjustment 
England and Northern 
Ireland 
4.8% in line with Retail Price Index 
Finland Bank dependent interest rate 1.6% (2013) 
France Bank dependent interest rate typically 3.8-4.5% 
Germany
7
 Zero nominal interest rate (negative real) 
Hong Kong
8
 3.6% set at no-loss-no-gain rate 
Iceland Up to 3% linked to CPI 
Japan
9
 Variable upper bound 3% 
Kenya 4% 





Namibia 1-2% above inflation 
The Netherlands Tied to market rate, at 2.7% (2005) 
                                                 
5
 Chile has three different loan types 
6
 China has three different types of loans 
7
 Germany has two different types of loans 
8
 Hong Kong has two different types of loans 
9
 Japan has two different types of loans 
10
 Mexico has four different types of loans 
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Norway Zero nominal interest rate (negative real) 
Peru 12.5% 
Philippines 6% 
Poland Half the discount rate of the National Bank of Poland 3.25% (2004-
2005) 
Portugal Fixed interest rate equal to Euro interest rate swap plus a maximum 




 6.6% of which Govt subsidises for poorer students 
South Africa Zero real rate – indexed to inflation 
Sweden
12
 Fixed annually at Govt rate minus 30% subsidy 
Swaziland 5% 
Taiwan 2.9% of which Govt subsidises for poorer students 
Tanzania Zero nominal interest rate (negative real) 
Thailand Zero real rate – indexed to inflation 
Turkey Zero real rate – indexed to inflation 
USA
13
 Adjusted annually upper bound 8.25%. 6.8% (2009) 
Wales Rate of inflation in line with Retail Price Index 
 
                                                 
11
 Republic of Korea has four different loan types 
12
 Sweden has two different loan types 
13
 USA has four different loan types 
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Fig. 4.1. Country specific interest rates.  
 
In a study conducted by Shen and Ziderman (2009) recovery ratios of loans were 
analysed across numerous countries in order to identify common factors which 
lead to increased repayment or efficiency of the scheme. Interestingly, the interest 
rate charged to borrowers did not systematically influence the recovery ratio. 
Recovery ratio values for the Philippines and Kenya were 1.32% and 5.59% 
respectively which were the lowest among the countries included yet both 
countries charged mid-range interest rates of 6% and 4% respectively.  USA has 
one of the highest rates of interest charged to their borrowers however, their 
recovery ratio was 75.63% and both Thailand and South Africa charge a zero real 
rate of inflation and had recovery ratios of 28.21% and 35.83% respectively (Shen, 
& Ziderman, 2009).   
 
These results suggest the level of interest charged to borrowers does not have a 
significant effect on the likelihood of borrowers repaying their debt. This 
contradicts a previous study on global student debt patterns conducted by Usher 




Interestingly, this study also showed New Zealand had one of the worst 
repayment ratios, and Usher (2005) advocated New Zealand adopt a lower rate of 
interest, like that of European countries, to improve this (only months before the 
blanket subsidy was introduced). This is particularly relevant for New Zealand as 
one of the motivating factors of introducing a zero rate of interest was in order for 
borrowers to repay their debts faster. However, despite this argument being 

















The introduction of zero real interest on student loans for all borrowers in New 
Zealand in 2006 was a significant change in policy which has likely had effects on 
income inequality. The direction and magnitude of these effects is particularly 
interesting to investigate, as theoretical predictions regarding the direction of 
inequality post policy, contradict those put forward by the Labour party.  
Previous theoretical research suggests the introduction of this type of blanket 
interest subsidy would result in a worsening of income inequality. This effect was 
justified by the negative implications of adopting non-price rationing of scarce 
educational resources and, the benefits of reduced loan durations with income-
contingent repayments, accruing primarily to wealthier borrowers.  
Testing the implications of adopting a non-price rationing based enrolment system 
would be optimal using data on enrolments. Identifying the characteristics of 
individuals who apply for university, but who were denied based on this system, 
would provide insight into the type of individuals this rationing was negatively 
impacting.  
Investigating the impact of this policy within an income-contingent repayment 
scheme would be most appropriate on up-to-date longitudinal data. These data 
would include integrated student loan status, income, and expenditure. Income-
contingent repayment schemes restrict the effect of this policy to the duration of 
the loan, rather than altering the monthly repayment amounts. Therefore, 
longitudinal data would be the most appropriate to analysis the effect of shorter 
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student loan repayment durations on income inequality using income data from 
individuals over time. Expenditure data would also be useful to examine if 
individuals are participating in income smoothing because of the policy change i.e. 
increasing their current expenditure because of the reduction in the length of debt 
repayment.  
Enrolment data including the counterfactual situation for individuals who apply to 
university but are denied is hard to source. Additionally, longitudinal datasets are 
extremely costly to undertake, and as a result no such survey which incorporates 
student loan status, income and expenditure currently exists. Furthermore, access 
to current longitudinal datasets such as, the Survey of Family Income and 
Employment (SoFIE) which incorporate at least some of these elements is 
expensive.  
This chapter does not endeavour to explicitly test each of the aforementioned 
theoretical predications given the data restrictions, rather, it provides a general 
overview of income inequality from 2002 to 2007, with econometric methods 
adopted to compensate where possible for the limitations in the dataset. 
 
5.2 Data  
 
In this section data from the New Zealand Income Survey (2002-2007) will be 
used, which are provided in the form of a Confidentialised Unit Record File 
(CURF). Statistics New Zealand runs this survey annually each June quarter as a 
supplement to the Household Labour Force Survey (HLFS). To avoid the 
identification of any one individual that may breach the Statistics Act 1975, 
extreme data values are top and bottom coded, rounded, and any household 
linkages removed. Full details of these procedures can be found on the Statistics 
New Zealand website (Statistics New Zealand, 2012a). This survey spans 
approximately 29,000 usual NZ residents which equates to approximately 15,000 
private households. All respondents are aged 15 years and over, and reside in rural 
and urban areas across NZ. The New Zealand Income Survey collects both 
household and individual information pertaining to gross wages and salaries, self-
employment, government transfers, and investment income.  
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One limitation of using CURF data is that the survey does not ask respondents 
whether or not they are a student loan holder. This restricts specific policy 
analysis in terms of the inequality effect resulting from the introduction of zero 
interest in 2006. In order to overcome this limitation, an unpublished study on 
student loan holders (Gibson, & Le, 2013) is used to identify characteristics of 
those likely to have a student loan (Appendix 5). Using imputing techniques a 
probability value is assigned to each individual in the NZIS which represents the 
likelihood of their being a student loan holder, and this probability is used to 
create a cumulative distribution function (Appendix 7). Applying the national 
representative proportion of student loan holders from 2002-2007 (Education 
Counts, 2013c) as a threshold value, any individual with a probability value which 
falls within this threshold will be used to form a subgroup of individuals who are 
most likely to be student loan holders. This subgroup will then be used to identify 
the changes to inequality across the sample time period. The total sample 
population will also be used to identify any significant changes to inequality in 
order to gain a general picture of inequality, and to disaggregate subgroup effects 
from any global effect.  
The unpublished study identified likely factors which were significantly 
associated with individuals being a student loan holder. These included: 
 Being female 
 Maori or Pacific ethnic group  
 Only the age range 25-45 was included, but being younger within this 
bracket was associated significantly with holding a student loan 
 Undertaking a degree rather than vocational training or a diploma  
 Living in the North Island or within the Canterbury region  
 
Additionally, the Student Loan Annual Report (SLAR) provides demographic 
information on student loan holders. The SLAR confirmed the increase in 
borrowing evident by females. This report also stated that those aged under 27 
represented 68% of all borrowers and this supports the lower portion of the age 
bracket 25-45 being significantly associated with holding a student loan. Over a 
third of borrowers were defined by the SLAR as identifying themselves as Maori 
or Pacific during the time period 1997-2011 which is relatively high considering 
their given population proportions and supports the findings of the previous study.  
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5.3 Measuring income  
 
5.3.1 Gross Income  
 
The detailed nature of the income data obtained in the NZIS enables multiple 
measures of gross income to be recorded. The income variable which includes all 
sources is defined by “Incomes received before tax from all sources such as wages, 
salary, self-employment, Government transfers, private superannuation and 
pension schemes and annuities” (Statistics New Zealand, 2002, p.42). These data 
are collected based on weekly values excluding self-employment where annual 
figures are recorded and this is divided to give weekly estimates.  
Research has shown that permanent income is a much better source of data to 
analyse inequality than current income, as a typical risk adverse individual will 
use their current income to smooth consumption. That is to say in a period of low 
income the household may use previous savings or borrow using credit in 
anticipation of higher future earnings. Obtaining permanent income values 
requires longitudinal studies which limits the applicability of obtaining this type 
of data. However, the NZIS collects both current weekly earnings from all sources 
and usual weekly earnings. Therefore, to approximate permanent income, usual 
weekly income values from all sources have been annualised.  
5.3.2 Disposable Income  
In order to obtain an income value relevant to a proxy for individual decision 
making, an approach undertaken by Stillman, Le, Gibson, Hyslop, and Mare 
(2012) was applied. This involved applying tax rates and ACC levies to annual 
income values
14
(Inland Revenue, 2013). Interestingly, based on economic theory 
the introduction of the blanket subsidy in 2006 for all student loan holders 
choosing to reside in New Zealand should in fact have had little impact on 
disposable income due to income contingent repayments.  
The reduction in the length of repayments due to the blanket interest rate subsidy 
does however, allow a group of individuals to pay back their loans earlier in 2007 
when compared with the counterfactual situation if interest was still accruing on 
                                                 
14
 This excludes a range of complicated tax measures.  
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student loans. Disposable income values for this particular group from 2006 to 
2007 should increase due to the elimination of their student debt. The magnitude 
of this effect is largely dependent on the number of borrowers in this situation and 
can be calculated using the following assumptions: 
 Student loan borrowers borrow the median loan balance (Education 
Counts, 2012) 
 Borrowers upon finishing study (3 years on average) earn the average 
graduate salary which increases over time according to the average 
graduate career progression path (Careers NZ, 2012) 
 Borrowers only make the obligated repayments (10%) 
 
Applying these assumptions and using equations 2.1 and 2.2, revealed only 
borrowers who started studying in 1998, studied for three years, and started an 
average graduate job in 2001 are affected by this. The number of new borrowers 
in 1998 was 46,884 which represents 9% of the total student loan borrowers in 
2007. Therefore, 9% of the subgroup of likely student loan holders will have 
higher disposable incomes in 2007 attributed to the removal of interest from 
student loans.  
5.3.3 Lifetime Income 
 
In an attempt to eliminate the effects of the subgroup of likely student loan 
holders having higher inequality simply due to their age, propensity score 
matching techniques will be used to match individuals in the subgroup with 
similar, but older counterparts. This technique will give a counterfactual measure 
of income which can be used to identify potential age effects. 
5.3.4 Standardised Income 
In addition to applying tax rates to gross income values these values will also be 
adjusted by average prices. This allows comparison across years in terms of the 
purchasing power of their income. The CPI 
15
reported by Statistics New Zealand 
will be used to adjust the values from quarter two, as this quarter corresponds with 
the collection timing of the survey.  
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Multiple methods of calculating inequality will be presented to ensure limited bias 
results from using one specific approach. Each approach carries with it an implicit 
or explicit judgement on the importance of changes in inequality towards different 
areas of the income distribution. Firstly, the Gini coefficient will be presented 
which shows how the equalized distribution of incomes in the sample deviates 
from the perfectly equal distribution.  This is calculated by the weighted sum of 
the individual’s income. The weight is implicitly determined solely by the rank-
order of the individual’s income in the distribution as shown below.   





   
                                                    
For                 
Where,    sample size 
   income 
   mean  
Following this the p90/p10 ratio will be presented which involves comparing 
those in the top 90
th
 percentile of the income distribution as a ratio to those who 
were placed in the 10
th
 percentile based on earnings. Finally, the Atkinson values 
will be calculated which gives the proportion of total income which would be 
required in order for the level of social welfare to be equal if incomes were all 
perfectly distributed.  This is calculated as the proportional difference between the 
sample mean and the equally distributed equivalent level of income. 
                                                       
 ̅    
 ̅
                                                                       
Where,  ̅   mean value of   
    equally distributed equivalent level of income 
The equally distributed equivalent level of income      is the level of income 
which, if everyone in the distribution received it, would produce the same social 
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Where,    sample size 
   = income of the  th individual 
    inequality aversion parameter 
The epsilon value is a sensitivity parameter which allows greater weighting to be 
placed on poorer individuals
16
. This parameter reflects the tolerance of loss in 
terms of transfers from richer to poorer individuals (Creedy, & Sleeman, 2006). 
Creedy and Sleeman (2006) showed that the different values of   all produced 
reductions in the Atkinson value, however the magnitude of the reduction varied 
greatly. A value of one will be used in subsequent analysis and represents 
substantial aversion to loss (Jenkins, 1991). This simplifies equation 5.3 to the 
following: 






)                                                            
Each inequality measure has advantages and disadvantages which this section will 
briefly outline; for a comprehensive comparison see Atkinson (1970), Litchfield 
(1999) and De Maio (2007). Using the Gini coefficient as a measure of inequality 
holds the advantage that it is the most widely used and understood measure of 
income inequality and this enables easier global comparisons. In addition, the 
Gini coefficient measure enables direct comparison of two populations regardless 
of their independent size.  However, using the Gini coefficient measure makes the 
inequality estimates most sensitive to the mode of the distribution which can be a 
disadvantage particularly if specific areas of the distribution are of interest. 
Further, the same inequality estimate can occur from several different 
distributions which can become an issue if the structure of the income distribution 
is of interest.  
A key advantage of using the Atkinson measure of inequality is the inclusion of a 
sensitivity parameter which can place a greater importance to a subgroup of 
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     is only concerned with total income and not how this income is disbursed compared with 




individuals within the sample which can highlight particular inequality changes 
for this group. This is an advantage as the researcher is able to place an explicit 
value judgement on what they consider to be the most important area of the 
income distribution. This advantage can also become a disadvantage as the 
infinite possible values of   can make comparisons limited. Finally, using decile 
ratios such as the p90/p10 offers a simple and easily understandable way to 
analysis inequality across specific population groups. One key disadvantage of 
using this type of measure is the inability to identify transfer sensitivity. For 
example, if money is transferred from a rich person to a poor person both the Gini 
coefficient and the Atkinson measures will show a more equal distribution, 
however the p90/p10 ratio does not identify this transfer sensitivity. 
All three measures will be presented in order to take advantage of their individual 
strengths while trying to limit the different disadvantages of each approach. In 
addition Kernel Density functions and Lorenz Curves will also be calculated 
which enables the exact changes of inequality to be visualised along the income 
distribution.   
5.5 Weights  
An additional limitation of the CURF data is the complex sampling method and 
multi-staged design under which the surveys are collected. To overcome any bias 
that may have arisen due to the use of clustered sampling, the CURF data 
provides replicate weights which are calculated using Kott's (2001) delete-a-group 
Jackknife procedures. Thus, weighted statistics will be calculated to avoid biased 
coefficients and standard errors. These weights are provided by Statistics New 
Zealand to allow each person in the sample to represent a number of people in the 
total population with similar characteristics.  
5.6 Subgroup 
Using the aforementioned characteristics and imputing techniques, a subgroup of 
the population will be used to identify any inequality changes experienced by 
those most likely to be a student loan holder. Each individual was assigned a 
probability value which represented the likelihood of them being a student loan 
holder. These probabilities were then graphed on a cumulative distribution 
function (Appendix 5) and a threshold value was assigned which represented the 
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percentage of the total New Zealand population who had a student loan in each 
respective year (Appendix 6). Any individual with a probability value above the 
threshold was used to represent the subgroup of the sample population who were 
most likely to be holders of a student loan.  
The negative coefficient on the age variable (Appendix 5) suggests those of a 
younger age had a higher probability of being a student loan holder. This is likely 
to impact inequality figures, and density functions as individuals who are younger 
are also more likely to have a lower income due a positive relationship between 
age and income until retirement (Deaton, 2005). To overcome this potential 
limitation, propensity score matching techniques will be used. This involves 
matching those within the subgroup to those aged 35-55, and subsequently those 
aged 45-65 who exhibit similar characteristics. This allows the comparison of 
weekly income values to examine if age mitigates the effect of younger student 
loan holders receiving less income. If this is the case then providing a subsidy to 
these individuals may be unnecessary as they are already likely to earn more over 
time.      
Let     and     be weekly usual earnings for any two counterfactual individuals in 
the sample population, where     represents individuals in the pre-determined 
subgroup who are most likely to be student loan holders, and     represents 
individuals aged 35-55 in the sample population whom are not in the subgroup. 
Creation of a propensity score using a probit equation based on a set of observable 
characteristics   gives a propensity score       which can be defined as       
      |    where the propensity score is the conditional probability of being a 
student loan holder. 
Using this propensity score, kernel matching techniques will be implemented to 
match those individuals in the sub-sample with their most similar older 
counterfactual. This allows the average treatment effect to be estimated which is 
defined as,  
   { {  |          }|    } 
              { {      |          }   {      |          }|    }               
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where the expected gain in weekly usual income for those who are most likely to 
be a student loan holder is compared with what their older counterfactuals 
currently earn.  
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) introduced three conditions that the average 
treatment effect relies on; ‘unconfoundedness’, ‘common support’, and 
‘balancing’. ‘Unconfoundedness’ refers to the assumption of conditional 
independence where given a set of observable covariates    assignment to 
treatment is random i.e. 
                |      
Therefore, any comparative differences that arise between the treated and the non-
treated group should arise solely due to the effects of the treatment.  ‘Common 
support’ is the notion that in a sufficiently large sample of observations for each 
  , a     and a     will be observed. The continuous nature of propensity scores 
supports applying a ‘kernel matching’ procedure where each treated individual 
    is assigned with a weighted average of non-treated individuals     rather than 
simply matching two observations. This weight is inversely proportional to the 
distance between propensity scores of treated and non-treated individuals which 
differs from nearest neighbour matching techniques. Nearest neighbour methods 
differ from kernel matching as each treated individual is matched with their 
nearest matching non-treated counterpart. Both measures will be calculated and 
given in appendix X. Finally, balancing tests will be used to ensure mean 
independence between the covariates and the treatment after the propensity score 
weighting.   
Three sets of matching covariates were used to predict the likelihood of being a 
student loan holder. These included the individual’s ethnicity, gender, and 
qualification. The choice of only a few parameters was made as although over-
parameterised models are unlikely to bias the model or make the estimates 





5.6.1 Sample versus total population  
 
Inferring economic behaviour from sample data is always likely to raise 
credibility issues. In order to overcome this limitation bootstrapping techniques 
and weights have been applied as aforementioned. However, in addition to this 
descriptive statistics can be utilised to ensure the subgroup is also representative.   
Statistics reporting the percentage of the New Zealand population who hold a 
degree or higher and who are aged 25-64 has steadily increased from 2002-2007 
which corresponds with the pattern observed in the NZIS collected. However, 
comparing the statistics from the table below show that the NZIS population aged 
25-45 has a larger proportion of degree holders compared with the total 
population. Interestingly, the magnitude of the changes between years is relatively 
similar across both samples, with a very small or negligible increase from 2005-
2006.  
 
Table 5.1  
Comparison of degree rates among NZ population and Sample population 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
NZ Pop % 14.4% 15.6% 16.9% 19.4% 19.7% 22.5% 
Sample Pop % 16.2% 17.9% 20.4% 23.3% 23.3% 26.1% 
Data Source: Education Counts, 2013c 
Descriptive statistics are presented in table 5.2 for the subgroup of likely student 
loan holders from 2002-2007. The smallest subgroup occurs in 2002 with only 
332 individuals while the largest subgroup occurs in 2007 with 1075 individuals. 
Interestingly, the proportion of the subgroup that held a degree in 2007 was the 









Subgroup descriptive statistics 
Subgroup  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Age 18-34 26.48 26.97 26.4 26.42 26.44 28.68 
 
[0.14] [0.09] [0.05] [0.06] [0.06] [0.16] 
Age 35-54 39.81 40.08 0 0 0 40.3 
 
[0.47] [0.29] 0 0 0 [0.17] 
Age 55-64 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Female 0.67 0.64 0.72 0.71 0.72 0.60 
 
[0.03] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] 
Maori and Pacific Island 0.31 0.2 0.22 0.19 0.22 0.09 
 
[0.03] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] 
School Qualifications  0.12 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.19 
 
[0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.01] 
Vocational  or trade Qualification 0.36 0.34 0.35 0.33 0.30 0.36 
 
[0.03] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] 
Bachelor or higher degree 0.42 0.37 0.44 0.47 0.48 0.30 
 
[0.03] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] 
Income (weekly) 473.36 546.98 512.16 489.81 526.63 661.22 
 
[27.75] [21.18] [21.37] [18.06] [16.69] [22.95] 
Sample Size  332 946 973 915 899 1075 
Note: Weighted standard errors are in parenthesis.  













5.7 Mean Income Changes  
 
Notes: Weighted Standard Errors. CPI adjusted base year 2006.  
Data Source: New Zealand Income Survey 2002-2007.   
 
All employed females in the subgroup experienced an increase in incomes from 
2002-2004 and then a decline in 2005. The highest income value for females in 
this subgroup occurred in 2006 before declining again in 2007.  This pattern 
differed from the pattern evident for employed females across the total sample 
population (fig. 5.1) where average income values increased across the entire 
timeframe with only a slight decline from 2003-2004. This resulted in both groups 
having a real income gain across the entire time period of 2% and 14% 
respectively.  
Males in the subgroup of likely student loan holders experienced a similar 
increase from 2002-2003 but then a decline from 2003-2004. This decline 
Table 5.3   
Mean Weekly Income Changes       
Average Incomes $ 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
All Persons 
      Employed 559 584.30 582.60 610.40 616.80 648.90 
Unemployed 1.51 1.08 2.21 0.35 1.38 6.90 
Females 
      Subgroup 
      Employed 591.30 621.50 634.80 621.40 641.80 628.90 
Unemployed 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Sample Pop 
      Employed 474.50 494.90 494.80 500.70 522.10 541.40 
Unemployed 3.07 0.30 4.04 0.61 0.46 3.79 
Males 
      Subgroup 
      Employed 661.80 784.70 740.80 668.30 708.80 840.80 
Unemployed 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Sample Pop 
      Employed 623.40 645.50 650.70 701.80 691.20 732.40 
Unemployed 0 1.72 0 0 2.77 6.84 
       Proportion with zero income 13% 14% 14% 14% 12% 12% 
Proportion with benefit income 30% 29% 28% 27% 29% 31% 
Proportion not in the Labour Force 34% 34% 34% 33% 32% 32% 
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continues from 2004-2005 before increasing from 2005-2007. Males in the total 
sample experienced an increase in average total income for the employed 
individuals from 2002-2005 then a decline in 2006 before increasing again in 
2007. This resulted in a real increase in incomes of 27% and 17% respectively. 
Wages of employed females in the total sample was on average 34% lower than 
their male counterparts highlighting the existence of gender inequality, however 
the value for the subgroup was only 18% suggesting tertiary education may 
mitigate some of these effects. 
Women within the subgroup have much higher wages than employed women in 
the total sample population (24% on average). While males in the subgroup also 
have higher incomes on average than males in the total population this is only by 
9% on average across the timeframe. This suggests the economic returns to 








Fig. 5.1: Mean Weekly Income Changes  
 
Interestingly, although there is quite a lot of variation evident in the mean income 
values across the sample the proportion of individuals with zero income or who 
are receiving some type of beneficiary payment is relatively stable. Participation 
in the labour force increases over the sample period which does not include 
individuals enrolled in educational institutions. This is surprising as it would be 
assumed the introduction of the blanket subsidy would attract more individuals 
into study which should increase non-participation in the labour force, however 
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enrolment in educational institutions is just one of five possible rationales given 
by the NZIS which explains non-participation in the labour force.  
 
5.8 The impact of inequality across predicted student loan 
holders 
This section presents inequality estimates using the Gini, p90/p10, and Atkinson 
measures of inequality. This allows comparison between the sub group of likely 
student loan holders and the total population, as well as, comparison before and 
after the introduction of interest free student loans in 2006.  
Table 5.4  
Inequality Measures 




Sample  Sub Pop 
Total 
Sample  Sub Pop 
Total 
Sample  
2002 0.295 0.352 4.000 5.682 0.179 0.223 
2003 0.319 0.359 4.792 5.826 0.192 0.226 
2004 0.293 0.357 4.591 6.045 0.181 0.229 
2005 0.281 0.353 5.252 5.360 0.171 0.223 
2006 0.260 0.344 4.583 5.333 0.147 0.214 
2007 0.312
17
 0.335 5.760 5.276   0.188 0.204 
Notes: Weighted Standard Errors. 
Data Source: New Zealand Income Survey 2002-2007.   
 
Inequality recorded using the Gini coefficient
18
 for the subgroup of likely student 
loan holders was the lowest in 2005 (0.260) while the highest inequality estimate 
was evident in 2003 (0.319). This was not confirmed by the results of the 90/10 
where the lowest value was recorded in 2002 and the highest value was recorded 
in 2007. This suggests the changes in income distribution are being driven by both 
changes at the extremes and at the mode of the distribution. The results of the Gini 
measure of inequality are confirmed by the Atkinson. Decomposing this effect it 
is evident this shift is due to a combination of both poorer people getting poorer 
                                                 
17
 Two outliers were excluded due to very large weekly income values 
18
 The Gini coefficient values range from 0 (perfect equality where everyone has the same income) 
to 1 (complete inequality where one person has all the income and the rest have none).  
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and richer people getting richer. Looking specifically at the changes which 
occurred after the introduction of the policy it is evident inequality decreased from 
2005-2006 however, this is not sustained through 2007 with all three measures 






Fig. 5.2. Measures of Inequality for the subgroup and total sample 
population 2002-2007.   
Graphing all three inequality measures below makes it visibly obvious there is a 
much larger variation in inequality within the subgroup of likely student loan 
holder values than the total sample population. Due to data restrictions the 
conclusions from these inequality measures are restricted to identifying general 
trends in inequality. However, the general trends in inequality particularly for the 
subgroup of most likely student loan holders are likely to include the specific 
effects of the introduction of the blanket subsidy in 2006.  
One particularly interesting trend from all three graphs is the increase in 
inequality from 2006-2007 which occurs for the subgroup but not for the total 
population. This suggests inequality may in fact be worsening since the 




5.8.1 Lorenz Curves – Subgroup 
 
A Lorenz curves for this subgroup of the population over the sampling time frame 









Fig. 5.3. Lorenz Curve 2002-2007.   
 
Results from this Lorenz curve confirm the results given from the aforementioned 
Gini coefficient that 2005 had the lowest inequality value. However, 2005 does 
not hold Lorenz dominance over all of the other years, particularly at the bottom 
of the distribution where it appears 2005 is one of the most unequal curves. 
Additionally, results from 2003 which recorded the lowest inequality value using 
the Gini and Atkinson measures of inequality, does not hold Lorenz dominance 
over the entire distribution. The most unequal curve towards the top of the 
distribution is 2007. Results from this section suggest looking more in depth at 
changes within the distribution may provide more valid insights into the changes 
in inequality. However, the results from 2007 suggest the introduction of the 
blanket subsidy on student loan interest rates may be having a regressive effect 




5.8.2 Kernel Density Functions  
 
Identification of the income distribution and shifts to this distribution over time 
can provide additional information regarding policy changes. A Kernel density 
function will examine logged CPI-adjusted weekly income values (base year 
2011Q1) for both the subgroup and total population from 2002-2007. The x-axis 
labels have been converted to NZ dollars to add interpretation.  
 
Fig. 5.4. Kernel Density Functions for the subgroup and total sample 
populations 2002-2007.  
Looking at the results for the subgroup of likely student loan holders shows the 
highest peak of the kernel density function occurs at approximately $800NZ per 
week. This occurs across all three time periods and there appears to be no 
significant change between any of the three time periods included. This suggests 
the impact of the blanket subsidy on student loan interest rates may not have 
significantly changed weekly income values. This result is not particularly 
surprising due to the income contingent repayments not altering the amount of 
monthly repayments.  
One interesting difference between the subgroup and the total sample is the peak 
in incomes in the total sample occurs at a slightly lower income value of 
approximately $700NZ per week. This suggests the income returns from tertiary 
education are significant when compared to the average of the total population. 
The total sample also appears to be slightly bimodal with a small peak occurring 




5.9 Propensity Score Matching 
 
This section uses propensity score and kernel matching techniques in order to 
match the subgroup of likely student loan holders with older similar individuals. 
This is to identify if the subgroup of likely student loan holders have lower 
incomes simply due to age rather than the effects of the blanket subsidy on student 
loan interest.  Ideally this analysis would be undertaken using longitudinal data, 
where individual income could be tracked over time, however these techniques 
provide a valid substitute.  
Figure 5.5 below displays the distribution of propensity scores for the subgroup 
and total population for 2002-2007 using histogram graphs. It is apparent that 
although some of the sample population exhibit characteristics similar to those in 
the subgroup of likely student loan holders a large majority of the sample 
population do not. This is not unexpected due to the high percentage of the total 
population of New Zealand who do not have a student loan. An implication of this 
result is that analysis will be restricted to the areas of overlap or common support 
where the two distributions overlap. Therefore, individuals who have a very low 














Fig. 5.5. Histogram of propensity score densities from 2002-2007 for the 
age bracket 35-55.  
 
Matching individuals who are likely to be student loan holders with older but 
similar counterfactuals used the covariates ethnicity and gender. This allowed the 
average treatment effect of the expected loss in weekly earnings for those likely 
student loan holders to be compared with their older counterparts. Results from 
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this showed that the average loss in weekly income for the subgroup ranged 
significantly from $81-$123. 
Table 5.5  
Kernel Matching (age 35-55) 
Year ATT $ per week S.E 
2002 -117.30 (25.01)*** 
2003 -80.50 (16.72)*** 
2004 -101.80 (15.64)*** 
2005 -120.70 (12.94)*** 
2006 -123.43 (14.05)*** 
2007 -92.80 (18.67)*** 
Notes: All matching includes gender and ethnicity. Bootstrapped Standard Errors reps (100). 
***significant at 1%.  
** significant at 5%. 
* significant at 10%. 
Data Source: New Zealand Income Survey 2002-2007.   
 
The negative relationship evident across all of the years provides support for the 
assumption that younger individuals earn less than their older counterfactuals. The 
magnitude of this effect differs across the years, which suggests the effect is not a 
fixed and constant effect. The lowest significant difference recorded occurred in 
2003 before the blanket subsidy was introduced. The highest difference was 
recorded in 2006 the year the blanket subsidy was introduced. Results suggest that 
individuals before the introduction of the blanket subsidy were already more 
likely to earn more in later years by an average of $105 per week. After the 
introduction of the policy individuals were more likely to earn an average of $108 
per week. This suggests the inequality of incomes in the subgroup may be driven 
by age effects and providing a subsidy to this group of individuals may in fact not 
be positively impacted inequality.  
Repeating this exercise for individuals aged 45-65 gives an additional picture of 
the average treatment effect when compared to similar counterfactuals in this 
older age bracket. The average treatment effect for this group over this timeframe 








Fig. 5.6. Histogram of propensity score densities from 2002-2007 for the 








Table 5.6  
Kernel Matching (age 45-65) 
Year ATT $ per week S.E 
2002 -24.10 (27.38) 
2003 -15.85 (16.09) 
2004 -0.10 (17.92) 
2005 -21.90 (12.47) 
2006 -22.70 (14.67) 
2007 -19.60 (16.57) 
Notes: All matching includes gender and ethnicity. Bootstrapped Standard Errors reps (100). 
***significant at 1%.  
** significant at 5%. 
* significant at 10%. 
Data Source: New Zealand Income Survey 2002-2007  
 
 
The results of the comparison between likely student loan holders and their 
counterfactuals aged 45-65 appears to have no significance results across this time 
period. This suggests wages between likely student loan holders and much older 
counterfactuals does not significantly change over time. This result is particularly 
interesting as it suggests investment in tertiary education may have a diminishing 
impact on income over time and play a less important role as individual’s age.  
  
5.10 Inequality in earnings, wages and expenditure  
This section examines changes in hourly, weekly, and annual income figures to 
identify any trends in income for the subgroup of likely student loan holders and 
the total sample population from 2002-2007. These income figures will be 










) to identify 
where in the income distribution income changes may be occurring. Additionally, 
ratios between these percentile groups will be presented to show how the gap 
between the richest and the poorest deciles compares with the median.  
It is expected that the majority of incomes for this subgroup  will experience no 
change because of the introduction of zero interest on student loans due to the 
income contingent repayment component. Income contingent repayments are a 
fixed proportion and therefore, monthly repayments remain constant but the 
 55 
 
duration of repayments will be reduced. The exception to this is the 9% of likely 
student loan holders who will now pay off their loans prior to the timing of this 
survey when previously this would not have been the case. The disposable income 
values for this group will be higher in 2007 than prior, due to the elimination of 











 percentiles for i) log hourly individual income ii) log weekly individual 
income if employed iii) log annual individual income and iv) log disposable 
income across the subgroup of the total population who are most likely to be 






Fig. 5.7. Percentile graphs for hourly, weekly, and annual income for the 
subgroup from 2002-2007.  
 
Firstly, looking at results of fig. 5.7 displaying hourly wages it appears no large 
deviations in hourly wages occurred over the time span across all percentile 
groups. Deviations did occur which were specific to each percentile group for 
example, those in the 90
th
 percentile experienced the most variations across the 
                                                 
19
 One outlier was excluded due to a very low recorded hourly income which skewed results.  
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time period, initially experiencing an increase of 2% in 2003 which was followed 
by a decrease of 10% and 5% in 2004/2005 respectively and then a subsequent 
increase of 6% and 19% in 2006/2007. The median percentile and the 75
th
 





percentile decreased by 6% and 1% respectively. All four percentile groups then 
experienced a small increase (3%, 2% and 3% respectively) except the 75
th
 
percentile who experienced a slight decrease (1%) from 2003-2004. From 2004-
2005 all four percentile groups experience a decrease of between 2 and 3 percent. 
All four percentile groups then experience a very small change of less than 1% 
from 2005-2006. Finally, from 2006-2007 all percentile groups experienced a 
large increase (2%, 5%, 11%, and 15% respectively). Interestingly, although all 
percentile groups experienced an increase from 2006-2007 this effect was the 
largest for the richer percentile groups. This corresponds with 2007 having the 
second highest inequality value and suggests changes in hourly wages may be 
driving this inequality estimate.  
Looking at the significant changes to weekly wages it appears the changes are 




 percentiles from 2002-2003. 
All three percentile groups experience an increase of 6%, 8% and 12% 
respectively while the 10
th
 percentile group decreases by 12% during this time 
period. This decrease continues from 2003-2004 for the 10
th










, median and 75
th
 percentile groups all experience a decrease from 







 percentiles from 2005-2006 of 7%, 4% and 3%. This 
increase continues for all five percentile groups from 2006-2007 (12%, 1%, 13%, 
17% and 23% respectively).   
This variability is surprising as weekly wages are often less volatile than hourly 
wages as individuals will typically substitute more or less hours to counteract a 
decrease or increase in hourly wages (income smoothing).  The large volatility 
evident in the 10
th
 percentile suggests that although individuals may have been 
experiencing some volatility in hourly wages this is exacerbated in weekly wages 
by individuals either choosing to work more (increase) or less total hours 
(decrease). The decrease evident from 2004-2005 correspond with the trends in 
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part time work recorded in the HLFS where part time work increased from 2004-
2005 which may be contributing to this effect (Statistics New Zealand, 2012c). 
Next examining total gross and disposable annual income, the changes mimic that 
of the weekly wage changes which is not surprising, however the magnitude of 









percentile from 2002-2003 have all halved in size, while the change for the 90
th
 







 percentile groups from 2004-2005, was an increase of 3% on average. 
Finally, the increase experienced for all five percentile groups from 2006-2007 





compared to weekly values, while those in the 90
th
 percentile group experienced a 
2% drop in magnitude. This is likely to have reduced income inequality between 
2006 and 2007. 
Comparing the changes between gross income and disposable income values in 
2007, it appears no significant difference is evident. This suggests the impact of 
the 9% of individuals finishing their student loan repayments is not large enough 
to drive a difference in the disposable values.  










 percentiles for i) 
log hourly individual income ii) log weekly individual income if employed iii) log 
annual individual income and iv) log disposable income across the total sample 
population. Graphing the total sample population allows a baseline to identify 
changes which were evident across the entire sample rather than those most likely 
to be a student loan holder. Excluding gross annual figures the hourly, weekly and 
disposable figures are much less variable. Interestingly, the trends evident in the 





Fig. 5.8. Percentile graphs for hourly, weekly, and annual income for the 
total sample population from 2002-2007. 
 
Examining the trends evident in hourly wages for the total population shows much 
less variation than the subgroup. All of the percentage changes across the years 
for each percentile group are under 5% with the exception of hourly wages for 
those in the 10
th
 which  increased by 8% from 2006-2007. Examining weekly 
wages again shows little variation between the years except for an increase across 
all percentile groups in 2007 ranging from 3%-6%. One interesting observation is 
while all percentile groups were either decreasing or only slightly increasing from 
2005-2006 those in the lowest 10
th
 percentile experienced a 7% increase. This 
corresponds to a lesser extent to the pattern seen in the sub sample of likely 
student loan holders who experienced a 12% increase. Comparing total gross and 
disposable annual income, it is evident only a small amount of variation occurs 
across the time period. An exception to this is the 8% (8% after taxes) increase 
experienced by those in the bottom 10% from 2005-2006.  
One notable feature is that those in the 10
th
 percentile do not earn significantly 
less than those in the 25
th
 percentile when looking specifically at hourly wages. 
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However, when examining weekly wages those in the 25
th
 percentile are earning 
over double those in the bottom 10
th
 percentile. It is likely those in the bottom 10
th
 
percentile are restricted in the number of hours they are able to earn and this 
results in the much lower weekly income values. This has a flow on effect on 
gross and disposable annual earnings where those in the bottom 10
th
 percentile 
earn less than half of those in the 25
th
 percentile.  
The large variation in the subgroup is not unexpected due to the smaller number 
of sample observations. However, there are distinct trends in the sub sample 
which are not emulated in the total sample. This suggests there may be some 
factors influencing earnings of those who are most likely to hold a student loan 
which is not influencing the rest of the population. In particular, the drop from 
2004-2006 and then the spiked increase in 2006-2007 experienced by all 
percentile groups is not evident in the total sample population. 
These results are particularly interesting as theoretical predictions suggest no 
income changes should have occurred immediately after the introduction of 
interest free student loans. This was because student loan repayments are 
restricted by income contingent repayments which mean that only the duration of 
the loan not the monthly repayment amount is less. This was not the case evident 
in the above data. Results suggest further investigation into the cause of these 
income changes and how these income changes have impacted the distribution of 
income would be interesting. The following section includes percentile 
comparisons to identify how these income changes have affected the distribution 
of income between the richest and poorest individuals and the average earning 
individual.   
 
5.10.1 Inequality below the median - Sub Sample  
This section will now compare these income changes for the lower end of the 





percentile values with the median or 50
th
 percentile value for the sub population. 
The difference in i) log hourly individual income ii) log weekly individual income 
if employed iii) log annual individual income and iv) log disposable income, is 




 percentile with the 50
th
 percentile in 
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levels. These figures show how the poorest individuals’ incomes compare to the 
average individuals’ incomes.  
 Fig. 5.9. Percentile ratios p50/p10 and p50/p25 for the subgroup from 2002-2007. 
 
Results from the 50/10 percentile ratio show on average a steady increase in 
inequality between the median and the 10
th
 percentile in hourly wages across the 
entire timeframe. In particular this gap increases significantly from 2006-2007. 
Weekly or individual income, (measured either by gross or disposable income) 
shows a similar increasing trend from 2002-2005, before decreasing from 2005-
2006 and then increasing again from 2006-2007.  
The outcome of hourly wages for the 50/25 percentile ratio appears slightly more 
variable than the 50/10 percentile ratio but it is on a much smaller scale. All four 
variables appear to increase on average across the entire timeframe. There does 
appear to be a decrease in income inequality from 2005-2006 which includes the 
introduction of the blanket interest subsidy on student loans. However, all four 
measures experience a significant increase from 2006-2007 which suggests this 
result was not sustained and in fact income inequality for this group has worsened.  
 
5.10.2 Inequality above the median – Sub Sample  
This section will now compare the upper end of the income distribution by 
comparing the difference between the 90th and 75th percentile values with the 
median across the sub population. The difference in i) log hourly individual 
income ii) log weekly individual income if employed iii) log annual individual 
income and iv) log disposable income, is equivalent to the ratio of the 90th and 
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75th percentile with the 50th percentile in levels. This allows comparison of the 
richest individuals with the median.  
 
  
Fig. 5.10. Percentile ratios p90/p50 and p90/p75 for the subgroup from 
2002-2007. 
 
Results from the 75/50 percentile ratio show there is a spike in hourly and weekly 
wages from 2002-2003 before a significant decrease from 2003-2005. This is then 
followed by a large increase from 2005-2007. Individual income (measured by 
either gross or disposable) variables follow a similar trend to hourly wages but 
experience an increase from 2004-2005 and a decrease from 2005-2006. Looking 
at the top of the distribution (i.e. the 90/50 distribution) it appears the same trend 
is occurring but the increase starts slightly earlier in 2004.  This large increase in 
particular from 2005 onwards is worrisome as this time period is inclusive of the 
interest free student loan policy introduction.  
 
5.10.3 Inequality below the median – Total Sample   
This section will now continue from the previous analyses and compare the lower 
end of the income distribution for the total sample population using the 50/10 and 
50/25 percentile ratios. The difference in i) log hourly individual income ii) log 
weekly individual income if employed iii) log annual individual income and iv) 












Fig. 5.11. Percentile ratios p50/p10 and p50/p25 for the total sample from 
2002-2007. 
 
Both figures show little change in either wage or earnings inequality across the 
sample period particularly in comparison to the subgroup. Both percentile ratios 
decrease over the entire sample period in terms of weekly and individual income. 
Hourly wage inequality steadily increased from 2004-2007 in the 50/25 percentile 
ratio which suggests worsening inequality for this group.  
 
5.10.4 Inequality above the median – Total Sample   
 
This section compares the upper end of the income distribution for the total 
sample population using the 75/50 and 90/50 percentile ratios. The difference in i) 
log hourly individual income ii) log weekly individual income if employed iii) log 





 percentile with the 50
th







Fig. 5.12. Percentile ratios p90/p50 and p90/p75 for the total sample from 
2002-2007. 
  
Both measures of the wage and earnings inequality in the upper distribution 
display increases from 2002-2007 in all measures excluding disposable income. 
This departure of disposable income and gross income is likely due to the increase 
in ACC levies which occurred in 2005. This is a proportional tax i.e. those on a 
higher income are expected to pay more in total which has likely had a positive 
impact on equality.   
Although wage and earnings inequality has increased for hourly and weekly 
wages it is important to take into account the scale of both of the ratios as it is an 
increase which is relatively small in magnitude 2% and 3% for 90/50 and 75/50 
percentile ratios respectively for hourly wages and 1% and 3% for 90/50 and 
75/50 percentile ratios respectively for weekly wages.  
Interestingly, results from the total sample appear almost contradictory to results 
from the subgroup of likely student loan holders. This does not adhere to 
theoretical predictions which suggested incomes of student loan holders should 
not be immediately affected due to income-contingent repayments. However, this 
may be because of an external factor which is simply more likely to affect 
individuals who hold the characteristics of the subgroup for example, higher 
education attainment. The next section will examine income changes for different 





5.10.5 The impact of education on inequality 
 
This section will examine the inequality changes across groups with different 
educational backgrounds i) No qualifications ii) School qualifications iii) Post 
school qualifications
20
 . This highlights the differences which arise due simply to 
returns to qualifications. This will be compared to prior analysis which focused on 
a subgroup of most likely student loan holders. This is in order to identify any 
differences which may have occurred to the subgroup which did not occur solely 
due to the returns received from having a higher qualification.  
 
      
  
Fig. 5.13. Percentile graphs for hourly wages across different educational 
backgrounds from 2002-2007. 
 
Looking at hourly wages for individuals with no qualifications across all 
percentile groups shows an increase from 2002-2007, with the largest percentage 
increase occurring for the bottom 10
th
 percentile group (14%). Due to the increase 
for those in the bottom 10
th
 percentile, within-group inequality has decreased by 6% 
                                                 
20
 This category combines both post school qualifications and trade and vocational qualifications 
to aid comparison.  
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across the time period. This pattern is also exhibited by individuals who held 
school qualifications with hourly wages across all percentile groups increasing 
across the entire time frame. Again, it was the bottom 10
th
 percentile group who 
exhibited the largest increase with an 11% increase. Individuals with post school 
qualifications (including trades) experienced an increase across all percentile 
groups with the largest increase occurring in the top 90
th
 percentile group (12%). 
The 75
th
 percentile group and the median value increased by 10% and 8% 
respectively which increased within-group inequality by 16%. Interestingly, 
although those who held a degree have also experienced an increase in hourly 
wages across all percentile groups from 2002-2007, the increase is much smaller 
than for all of the other qualification groups which suggests the monetary returns 
from tertiary education may be diminishing.  
 Looking specifically at individuals who hold a degree across i) log hourly 
individual income ii) log weekly individual income if employed iii) log annual 
individual income and iv) log disposable income enables comparison to the prior 
subgroup analysis. Any significant patterns which occur only in one group are 
likely to have occurred due to an outside influence rather than possessing a degree 
or higher qualification.  
Fig. 5.14. Percentile graphs for hourly, weekly, and annual income for degree 
holders or higher from 2002-2007. 
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Very similar patterns occurred across both groups in terms of hourly wages, 
although slightly less variation occurred in the group of individuals who held a 
degree or higher qualification. Interestingly, the decrease which occurs in the 
subgroup in 2005 for the bottom 10
th
 percentile across all four income variables is 
not evident across all degree holders. This suggests an effect which is only 
relevant for holders of a student loan in the bottom 10
th
 percentile may be driving 
the results evident in weekly wages. For example, student loan holders may be 
more likely to switch to part-time work or return to study.  
The sample of likely student loan holders is on average worse off across all four 
income measures than simply the sample of degree holders or higher. This is not 
unsurprising as student loans are financial mechanisms designed to provide 
financial aid to students, while some degree holders do not need this assistance. 
This does however provide some support towards the subsidisation of student 
loans as these individuals may have worse inequality because of characteristics 
which are unrelated to holding a degree or higher qualification. The next section 
investigates the different ways individuals in the subgroup of likely student loan 
holders source their income and the subsequent effects on inequality.  
 
5.11 Decomposing Inequality 
 
This section decomposes inequality by income source using a method developed 
by Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985). This method allows the impact of each income 
source on inequality to be examined for the subgroup of likely student loan 
holders. Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) show that the Gini coefficient for total 
income   can be represented by: 
                                                         ∑       
 
   
                                                            
Where:     share of source   in total income 
               = the source Gini 
               = Gini correlation of income from source   with the distribution of                                                                                                              




This method can then be used to estimate the effect on total income inequality of a 
percentage change in income from a particular source. This is calculated by: 
 
                                                     
      
 
                                                               
 
 
Using this method total income will be divided by 7 categories: Earnings from 
wages/salary, Self Employed earnings, Government Transfers (minus ACC), 
Overtime earnings, ACC payments, Private Superannuation payments, and Other 
income such as annuities
21
. Decomposing income into these 7 types allows 
investigation into how each source has contributed to inequality from 2002-2007.  
 
Table 5.6 compares the decomposition figures using average values before and 
after the introduction of the blanket subsidy on student loan interest rates. Results 
reveal that earnings from wages and salary are the main income source across all 
years. Wage and salary income contributed between 79% and 88% of total income 
while always negatively contributing to equality. This effect remains constantly 
negative, however the effect of this impact is highest in 2002 and the lowest in 
2007 as seen in fig. 5.15 below. Self-employment income has a negative effect in 
all years except 2005, which could be attributed to individuals substituting wages 
and salary for self-employed work. However, in 2005 self-employment income is 
positively associated with inequality. Government transfers excluding ACC have 
a positive effect on inequality across all of the years which is unsurprising as the 
role of targeted government transfers is to reduce inequality. Over time earnings 
represent a small share of income, but always negatively impact equality. A study 
by Carr (1986) profiled overtime workers as primarily married males aged 24-35. 
This supports overtime negatively contributing to equality as males in this age 
category are more likely to be higher income earners than their younger or much 
older counterparts.  
It is also unsurprising that private superannuation or pension contributions are 
almost zero due to the negative coefficient on the age variable in the prior analysis 
                                                 
21
 Typically the last three sources were excluded from analysis due to having no influence on the 




which suggested younger individuals were more likely to hold student loans. 




Decomposition of Inequality – Pre Policy vs Post Policy 
    
Salary  
Self- 
employed Benefit  ACC  Other Overtime  
Share of 
total income 
(S) Pre 2006 0.794 0.084 0.112 0.002 0 0.008 
 




(G) Pre 2006 0.516 0.971 0.837 0.748 0 0.983 
 
Post 2006 0.516 0.977 0.821 0.995 0.500 0.985 
Correlation 
with rank of 
total income 
(R ) Pre 2006 0.883 0.615 -0.315 0 0 0.733 
 




(I) Pre 2006 0.925 0.133 -0.074 0.002 0 0.015 
 




(I/S) Pre 2006 1.164 1.591 -0.667 0.747 0 1.833 
 
Post 2006 1.204 1.240 -0.687 0.292 0.042 1.803 
Total 
income 
 Pre 2006 0.392 
 
    
  Post 2006 0.382          








































The general picture of inequality prior to the introduction of interest free student 
loans (2002-2005) and post introduction (2006-2007) reveals no consistent or 
sustained trends evident across the income and inequality measures. The average 
weekly income values for both male and female subgroups of likely student loan 
holders were higher than for the total sample population across the entire time 
period. This suggests the private returns to education are significant.  
Since the introduction of this policy only average weekly incomes for males who 
are likely to be student loan holders have increased, while females from this 
subgroup only benefitted from 2005-2006 before their average weekly incomes 
decreased in 2007. Decomposing income effects using hourly and individual 
annual income (measured by either gross or disposable) also revealed no clearly 
identifiable trends pre and post policy introduction. These results are not 
unexpected as New Zealand student loan repayments are based on an income 
contingent scheme and therefore, this policy did not reduce the weekly or monthly 
repayment amounts, simply the duration of the loan. An exception to this was the 
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if interest had continued to accrue. However, this group appears not to have 
significantly altered results.  
Reducing inequality and increasing access to tertiary education was a main driver 
of this policy intervention which is supported initially by both the Gini and 
Atkinson measures of inequality as an increase in equality occurs from 2005-2006 
however, this result is not sustained and equality decreases again in 2007. Further, 
comparing the subgroup of likely student loan holders to older, similar 
counterfactuals revealed that the subgroup of likely student loan holders is more 
likely to earn less simply due to their age, and that on average their 35-55 year 
olds were better off by $100 per week. This result suggests providing a subsidy to 
a group of individuals who are already characteristically more likely to earn more 















Public preference for policy plays a significant role in influencing political 
outcomes for a representative democratic government (Burstein, 2003). This was 
evident when the Labour Party announced the decision to remove interest from all 
student loans in 2005, which was cited as the promise which won the Labour 
party another term. The decision to eliminate interest from all student loans was 
not a policy aimed at increasing efficiency, rather it was targeted at increasing 
fairness and educational equality by assisting students to overcome financial 
barriers to undertaking study (Ministry of Education, 2014).   
 
The introduction of interest free student loans will also ensure  
that young people find it easier financially to acquire tertiary  
qualifications.  
– Helen Clark (2005).  
While it appears individuals in 2005 were concerned about educational equality it 
is interesting to investigate if this is consistent with current public attitudes. An 
up-to-date dataset which integrated individual’s attitudes towards inequality, and 
the introduction of the blanket subsidy on student loans, would be the most 
appropriate to model attitudes since this policy change. A recent dataset would 
also be particularly useful as the world economic forum has released statistics that 
show income disparity has been voted as the number one global issue from 2012-
2014 (World Economic Forum, 2014). However, due to the unavailability of such 
a dataset this chapter will examine how attitudes towards inequality have changed 
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in the last decade in New Zealand using International Social Survey Programme 




International Social Survey Programme surveys are undertaken annually in 
approximately 48 nations. New Zealand has participated in the ISSP surveys since 
1991, participating in 22 subsequent surveys where a probability-based 
nationwide sample of approximately 1128 adults has been surveyed at random 
from the total population each year. Topics vary annually, with the main focus on 
inequality in 1987, 1992, 1999, and 2009. The surveys from 1999 and 2009 will 
be used in this research as student loans were introduced post 1992 and therefore, 
attitudes towards inequality postdating this are the most relevant for this research. 
Approximately 1108 and 935 respondents were surveyed from New Zealand in 
1999 and 2009 respectively. The ISSP survey collects detailed demographic 
information which can identify any differences between the 1999 and 2009 
sample which may have influenced results. Both surveys used Likert-type style 
scales as a psychometric measure and the specific examples are provided in table 
6.1 below.  
 
6.3 Methods  
The use of a Likert-type scale creates a latent variable across different possible 
attitudes with unknown distances between categories. In other words, how one 
individual interprets phrases such as “strongly agree” may differ from how 
another individual interprets it. This ordinal response variable influences which 
methods are most appropriate for the correct modelling of these attitudes. OLS 
results will be presented in order to facilitate comparisons with an ordered probit 
model. Less weight will be placed on the OLS results as this estimator becomes 
biased and inefficient with a categorical dependent variable. Such biases arise 
because of the assumptions of the OLS estimator. One set of assumptions includes 
the requirement that the data be distributed around some line such that      
       with an error term of constant variance, and a mean of zero. McKelvey and 
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Zavoina (1975) have shown this is unlikely to occur for ordinal dependent 
variables, and subsequently can invalidate the conclusions drawn. The likely 
impact of this bias is that impacts of certain variables may be underestimated. 
Furthermore, OLS assumes that if two individuals give the same response they 
must have the same attitude. Although this is unobservable, a model should take 
into account the possibility of variation within responses (Daykin, & Moffatt, 
2002). 
Ordered probit models rely on the assumption that “the ordinal response is a latent, 
continuously distributed random variable representing propensity to agree” 
(Daykin, & Moffatt, 2002, p.158). This approach uses a non-linear maximum 
likelihood estimation procedure explained below which is not restricted by the 
above assumptions of the OLS model.  
 
6.3.1 Ordered Probit model  
Letting   represent the ordered response which can take on 5 possible values i.e. 
strongly agree, agree etc             an ordered probit model can be derived 
from a latent variable model. The latent variable   is the unmeasured determinate 
of the   value where: 
                  
                                                                                                                   (6.1) 
This assumes   is normally distributed with a variance normalised to one. Next it 
is necessary to determine the threshold points for the continuous latent variable   . 
This is because the value of the observed   response is dependent on whether or 
not the individual has crossed a certain threshold. The threshold points are defined 
as: 
          
Although it is not possible to observe the latent variable it is possible to observe 
the choice an individual will make according to: 
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Because         the choice possibilities become: 
                
                    
                    
                    
                
It is now possible to define the probability of observing each   value    
        . The smallest value and the largest value have expressions which are 
similar to the binary probit model and are defined as: 
     |              
                                  
                        
                                                                                                                (6.2) 
     |              
                                  
                                  




In order to identify the probability of an individual selecting a category in the 
middle of the choice set such as agree or disagree the formula becomes: 
     |                   
                                                    
                                                                
                                                         (6.4) 
This can be written as: 
                              |                                                             
                              |                                                              
                              |                                                              
 
 
Interpreting the coefficients of the estimates is not as straightforward as in the 
OLS models as the effect of each variable on            is no longer linear. 
Interpretation requires calculation of the marginal probit effects in order to see the 
partial effects of a small change in a particular explanatory variable    on the 
probabilities. This is calculated for the lowest category (strongly agree) using: 
                                          
      |  
   
                                                      
For the highest category (strongly disagree) using: 
                                              
      |  
   






Finally for the intermediate categories: 
               
       |  
   
                                                           
                 
      |  
   
                                                         
                
      |  
   
                                                          
 
These calculations will be repeated for all   values to estimate the marginal 
effects of each   variable on the probabilities.  
 
6.4 Results – Unconditional Differences 
 
Differences exist both in terms of demographic characteristics and attitudes 
towards inequality between the 1999 respondents and 2009. Significant 
demographic differences (at the p<0.05 level) between the two samples include, 
respondents from 2009 being slightly older, more likely to be male, and to have 
completed more years of education. Individuals from 2009 were also less likely to 













Notes: Sample Size: 1108 (1999), 935 (2009). Weighted standard errors in parentheses.  








    ρ-value 
for equal 
means 
  Mean  
Std 
Error Mean  
Std 
Error 
Personal Characteristics  
     Age  47.2 (0.493) 46.08 (0.61) 0.000 
Male  0.505 (0.015) 0.520 (0.018) 0.025 
Years of Education 13.5 (0.208) 14.6 (0.205) 0.004 
Married or De facto 0.644 (0.015) 0.600 (0.019) 0.780 
Number of people in HH 3.01 (0.047) 3.04 (0.055) 0.026 
Unemployed 0.215 (0.031) 0.420 (0.053) 0.001 
      Inequality (1=Strongly Agree, 
5=Strongly Disagree) 
     Differences in income in NZ are too large 2.124 (0.031) 2.355 (0.036) 0.000 
Government’s Responsibility to reduce 
income differences 2.754 (0.040) 2.916 (0.042) 0.012 
      Society (1=Type A (a lot of individuals in 
the bottom and few in the middle or top), 
5=Type E (few people in the bottom and 
a lot in the top) - Appendix 2) 
     What type of society is NZ today  2.495 (0.032) 2.942 (0.035) 0.000 
What type ought it be 3.942 (0.024) 4.067 (0.029) 0.010 
      Individual (1=Much less, 5=Much More) 
     Is your pay just 2.363 (0.025) 2.437 (0.030) 0.046 
      Opinion (1=Very Just, 5=Very Unjust) 
     Just or unjust - higher incomes can afford 
better education 3.289 (0.042) 2.994 (0.043) 0.000 
Just or unjust - higher incomes can afford 
better healthcare 3.349 (0.041) 3.038 (0.043) 0.000 
      Importance for Pay (1=Essential, 5=Not 
important at all) 
     Number of Years spent in Education 2.404 (0.026) 2.557 (0.030) 0.000 
      Conflict (1=Very strong conflict, 4=No 
conflict) 
     Conflict between rich and poor 2.481 (0.023) 2.698 (0.024) 0.000 
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Attitudes to inequality also varied significantly across the two time periods. In 
response to whether individuals thought it was the Government’s responsibility to 
reduce the differences in incomes, results showed there was a statistically 
significant difference between the time periods (p<0.05). Respondents in 1999 
were more in favour of it being the Government’s responsibility to reduce 
differences in income whereas respondents from 2009 were on average more 
indifferent as to the Government’s role. The survey respondents in each year were 
also asked if they believed differences in incomes in NZ are too large. Individuals 
from the 1999 sample tended to agree with this statement while 2009 individuals 
were more indifferent. Respondents from 2009 believed there is less inequality in 
society than those in 1999 based on the type of society they believed they 
currently lived in (p<0.05). However, both 2009 and 1999 respondents have a 
preference towards a society with an even lower level of inequality.  
When asked whether individuals considered their own pay just, there was a 
significant difference at a 95% confidence level with individuals in 1999 
considering their pay less just than 2009 respondents. In response to the question 
regarding the justness of those on higher incomes being able to provide better 
education for their children, there was a significant difference between those in 
2009 and 1999 (p<0.05). Individuals in 2009 were more indifferent than those in 
1999 with regard to this practice being unjust. Respondents from 2009 also felt it 
was more just that higher incomes can afford better healthcare than was the case 
for respondents from the 1999 survey.  
  
6.5 Discussion  
In terms of the demographic variables it is unsurprising that respondents from 
2009 had a higher number of years of completed education, as this fits with the 
New Zealand trend of higher investment in human capital. Interestingly, the 
unemployment level was higher for the 2009 sample compared with 1999. This 
sample does not correspond with the trend in national recorded unemployment 
levels as 2009 recorded an annual level of unemployment of 6.2% compared with 
7.2% in 1999 (Reserve Bank, 2012). National sample weights were included in 
the survey to ensure limited bias of coefficients and standard errors arose due to 
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sampling bias and non-response. These weights are purely for national 
comparison as no international weights were provided within this survey.  
Interestingly, both groups thought New Zealand should have less inequality and 
be more representative of a society like that of type D, a society with the majority 
of people in the middle (Appendix 2). This result is of particular importance to 
this study as it shows there is a desire for more equality.  
However, respondents from 2009 were more indifferent regarding the 
Government’s role in reducing income differences and furthermore, they thought 
it was more just than 1999 respondents that those with a higher income could 
afford both better education and healthcare. This contradicts earlier predictions 
and suggests individuals in 2009 would be less supportive of a blanket subsidy, as 
those with higher incomes should reap the benefits of their children affording a 
better educational experience. This response is particularly relevant to this thesis 
as it shows individuals have a preference for higher equality. However, 
decomposing these attitudes shows that individuals are not concerned with 
inequality specifically in terms of health and education. Further, they do not 
believe equality should be brought about through Governmental mechanisms for 
redistributing income.  
 
6.6 Results – Conditional  
 
The statistical significant difference in average demographic characteristics across 
the two time periods indicates a need to condition these characteristics in case the 
unconditional comparisons in Table 6.1 simply reflect different sample 
compositions. Specifically, I will use regression analysis in order to identify if 





6.7 OLS Regression 
Table 6.2  
OLS Regression Results 
Notes: Sample has N=2043 observations. Weighted standard errors in parentheses.  
***significant at 1%  
** significant at 5%. 
* significant at 10%. 
Source: ISSP data surveys 1999 and 2009. 
 
Inequality Society  
Opinion -Higher incomes can 
afford better  
Importance for 
Pay  Conflict Individual 
 




Type of society 
today 
Type ought to 
be Education Healthcare 
   
          
Year - Dummy  0.218*** 0.160*** 0.445*** 0.096** -0.308*** -0.319*** 0.147*** 0.219*** 0.100**   
 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
Age  -0.007*** -0.004** -0.006*** -0.009*** -0.004* 0 -0.006*** -0.002 0.001 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Male -0.196*** -0.159*** -0.105** 0.039 0.097 0.154** -0.180*** -0.123*** -0.047 
 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
Years in Education 0.010* 0.006 0.007 0.005 0 -0.001 -0.006 0.001 -0.007**  
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married or De Facto 0.047 0.163** 0.165*** 0.040 0.045 0 0.068 0.080** 0.085** 
 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Number of People in 
HH -0.028 -0.076*** -0.035* -0.011 -0.062** -0.043* -0.023 -0.028** -0.022 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Unemployed -0.035* -0.123*** -0.054** -0.029* -0.00 0.002 -0.038** -0.056*** -0.071*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Constant 2.507*** 3.119*** 2.758*** 4.289*** 3.611*** 3.459*** 2.889*** 2.664*** 2.468*** 
  (0.14) (0.18) (0.15) (0.13) (0.19) (0.19) (0.12) (0.10) (0.11) 
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Decomposing the respondents’ attitudes toward inequality into demographic 
components shows there are marked differences across the two time periods. The 
coefficient for the dummy variable which represents the time period is significant 
across all aspects of inequality queried. This is unsurprising as it supports the 
earlier results. Table 6.3 summarizes the significant demographic factors 












































Table 6.3  
OLS Regression Results – Demographic Factors 




Age  Male 
Years in 
Education 
Married or De 
Facto 
Number of People in 
HH 
Unemployed 
Differences in Y are too large ● ● ● ● 
  
● 
Govt. Responsibility to reduce differences in 
Y ● ● ● 
 
● ● ● 
        Inequality 
       Type of society today ● ● ● 
 
● ● ● 
Type ought to be ● ● 
    
● 
        Opinion -Higher incomes can afford better  
       -Education ● ● 
   
● 










● ● ● 




● ● ● 






Notes: ●=significance at any level above 10%  
Source: ISSP data surveys 1999 and 2009.
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Results from the OLS regression highlight a significant difference exists between 
individuals in 2009 and 1999. The year dummy variable is statistically significant 
(p<0.05) across all nine questions relating to inequality. Individuals in 2009 were 
more likely to disagree with the statements:  
 Differences in income are too large 
 It is the Governments responsibility to reduce differences in income  
 The type of society we live in today should be one with a small elite at the 
top, very few people in the middle and the great mass of people at the 
bottom 
 We ought to live in a society with the aforementioned characteristics 
 Education is important for pay  
 There exists conflicts between rich and poor individuals 
 Their own individual pay is just  
While agree with: 
 Those on higher incomes should be able to afford better education and 
health 
This suggests individuals in 2009 may react differently to individuals in 1999 
regarding public policies which involve inequality. This next section will look at 
demographic effects which may also be creating differences in opinion within 
each year.  
When asked the question “Are differences in income too large?” age and gender 
were significant variables with males and older individuals being more likely to 
agree with this statement.  Both years of education and being unemployed were 
only weakly significant (p<.10). Those who were unemployed were more likely 
to agree that differences in income are too large whereas, more years of education 
made an individual more likely to disagree.   
In terms of whether the individual thought it was the Government’s responsibility 
to reduce differences in income, age was associated with agreement (p<0.05). 
Being unemployed, male and the number of people in the household were all 
highly significant (p<0.01) and more likely to agree with it being the 
Government’s responsibility. Being married or de facto was significant (p<0.05) 
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and was more likely to make an individual disagree with it being the 
Government’s responsibility.  
When asked what type of society the individual believed they lived in today 
individuals who were married or de facto were more likely to believe they lived in 
a more equal society (p<0.01). The individual’s age was highly significant 
(p<0.01) as well as whether they were unemployed or male (p<0.05) and had 
more people in their household (p<0.10). All of the respondents in these 
categories were more likely to believe they currently lived in a more unequal 
society.  
As a follow up question individuals were asked what type of society they believed 
it ought to be. Age was statistically significant, with older people more likely to 
say it ought to be more unequal, characterised by a few people at the top and the 
majority of people at the bottom. Whether or not an individual was unemployed 
was also significant (p<0.10) and unusually, also more likely to say it ought to be 
more unequal.  
When asked whether respondents thought their own pay was just, individuals who 
were unemployed were less likely to agree with their own pay being just, (p<0.01) 
as well as, having more years of education (p<0.05). Being married or de facto 
increased the likelihood of agreeing (p<0.05) that the respondent would believe 
their own pay was just.   
The questions “should those on higher incomes be able to afford better education?” 
and separately in terms of healthcare were also posed to respondents. Having a 
higher number of people in the household was significantly related to both these 
statements and associated with disagreement. Age was also associated with 
disagreement when asked specifically about education (p<0.10) while being male 
was associated with agreement when asked solely about healthcare (p<0.05). 
 Individuals were also asked whether they believed the number of years spent in 
education was important for pay. Individuals who were older or male were more 
likely to agree with this statement (p<0.01) as well as individuals who were 
unemployed (p<0.05). 
Finally, individuals were asked if they thought there was strong or no conflicts 
between those who are rich and those who are poor. Males and unemployed 
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individuals were more likely to think no conflicts exist at a statistically significant 
level (p<0.01) along with those who have a large number of people in their 
household (p<0.05). Individuals who were married or de facto were more likely to 





6.8 Ordered Probit  
Table 6.4 
Ordered Probit Results 
 
Inequality Society  
Opinion -Higher incomes can 
afford better  
Importance for 
Pay  Conflict Individual 
 




Type of society 
today 
Type ought 
to be Education Healthcare 
   
          
         
                
Year - Dummy  0.243*** 0.146** 0.469*** 0.135** -0.250*** -0.264*** 0.208*** 0.346*** 0.133**   
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 0.05 
Age  -0.007*** -0.004** -0.006*** -0.012*** -0.004** -0.001 -0.009*** -0.002 0.001 
 
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 0 
Male -0.196*** -0.131** -0.102* 0.033 0.072 0.125** -0.257*** -0.193*** -0.063 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 0.05 
Years in Education 0.010* 0.006 0.007 0.007 0 -0.001 -0.006 0.002 -0.010*  
 
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0.01) (0.01) (0) (0) -0.01 
Married or De Facto 0.040 0.129** 0.168*** 0.035 0.026 -0.007 0.114 0.117** 0.111** 
 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06 0.06 
Number of People 
in HH -0.031 -0.065*** -0.036* -0.003 -0.054** -0.037* -0.039 -0.042** -0.029 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 0.02 
Unemployed -0.040* -111*** -0.051* -0.043* -0.004 -0.005 -0.039* -0.088*** -0.095*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 0.03 
 
Notes: Sample has N=2043 observations. Weighted standard errors in parentheses. The ordered probit coefficients show the effect of 
the independent variable on a linear index. 
***significant at 1%  
** significant at 5%. 
* significant at 10%. 
Source: ISSP data surveys 1999 and 2009. 
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6.9 Marginal Effects – Strongly Agree 
 
Interpretation of the above ordered Probit model requires calculation of marginal 
effects. The results included below are the probability individuals strongly agreed 
with each of the statements using equation 6.8. 
 
The ordinal nature of these data enables analysis for any of the categories such as 
agree, disagree etc, but just one has been selected one for simplicity. Table 6.5 
summarizes the significant demographic factors associated positively or 









Age  Male 
Years in 
Education 
Married or De 
Facto 
Number of People in 
HH 
Unemployed 
Diff in Y too large ○ ● ● ● 
  
● 
Govt. Responsibility to reduce differences in 
Y ○ ● ● 
 
○ ● ● 
        Inequality 
       Type of society today ○ ● ● 
 
○ ● ● 
Type ought to be ○ ● 
     
        Opinion -Higher incomes can afford better  
       Education ● ● 
   
● 






        Educations importance for pay  ○ ● ● 
   
● 




○ ● ● 






Notes:  ●=significance at any level above 10% which was positively associated with strong agreement.  
○=significance at any level above 10% which was negatively associated with strong agreement. 
Source: ISSP data surveys 1999 and 2009.
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Results from the probit analysis reveal the year dummy variable is significantly 
associated (at a 95% confidence level) both positively and negatively to strong 
agreement to all of the questions asked about inequality. This suggests there is a 
significant difference between attitudes in 1999 and 2009. Individuals in 2009 
were less likely to strongly agree with the following statements:  
 Differences in income are too large 
 It is the Governments responsibility to reduce differences in income  
 The type of society we live in today should be one with a small elite at the 
top, very few people in the middle and the great mass of people at the 
bottom 
 We ought to live in a society with the aforementioned characteristics 
 Education is important for pay  
 There exists conflicts between rich and poor individuals 
 Their own individual pay is just  
While they were more likely to strong agree that: 
 Those on higher incomes should be able to afford better education and 
health 
This suggests individuals in 2009 are less likely to regard education as an 
important factor influencing pay and that Governments should not intervene in 
order to reduce the differences that currently exist in incomes. Further, they 
believe those on higher incomes should be able to afford better education than 
those on lower incomes. This suggests individuals in 2009 may be less likely to 
support the large subsidisation of tertiary education that exists through the 
introduction of zero interest in the student loan market.  
These differences between 1999 and 2009 may be driven by demographic 
differences in the 2009 sample. The next section will examine to what extent these 





6.9.1 Demographic differences – strongly agree 
With each additional year of age the likelihood of an individual strongly agreeing 
with the statement “Are differences in income are too large” increases by 0.2 
percentage points. Males are 6.1 percentage points more likely to strongly agree 
with this statement compared to women, and those who are unemployed are more 
likely by 1.3 percentage points, while the more years spent in education reduces 
the likelihood of agreeing with this statement by 0.3 percentage points.  
When asked whether respondents thought it was the Government’s responsibility 
to reduce differences in income, each additional year of age increased the 
likelihood they would strongly agree with this statement by 0.1 percentage points. 
Being male, unemployed or having more people in your household all increased 
the probability by 3.1, 2.6 and 1.5 percentage points respectively. The only factor 
which decreased the likelihood of agreement was being married or de facto which 
decreased the probability by 3.0 percentage points.  
Each additional year of age made respondents 0.1 percentage points more likely to 
rate the society they live in today as one with a small elite at the top, a few in the 
middle and a large amount at the bottom. Those who were unemployed were also 
1.0 percentage points more likely to agree with this type as well as males who 
were 2.1 percentage points more likely. However, being married or de facto made 
individuals 3.4 percentage points more likely to disagree that they live in this type 
of society. When asked what type of society they thought they ought to live in 
only age was significant however, with a margin effect of less than 0.1 percentage 
points.  
In response to the question “Do you think it is a just practice that those with a 
higher income can afford a better education?”, the number of people in the 
household and the individual’s age both made a significant difference at the 
margin. As the number of people in the household or age increased this was 
associated with strong agreement with this statement by 1.1 and 0.1 percentage 
points respectively. When asked the same question but with regard to healthcare 
being male was associated with disagreement by 2.5 percentage points.  
Participants were asked how essential they thought education was in terms of 
determining pay. Whether the individual was male, older or unemployed were all 
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characteristics associated with believing education is essential (4.4, 0.2 and 0.9 
percentage points respectively).  
Being unemployed or having more years in education made individuals more 
likely to think their pay is much less than is just by 2.1 and 0.2 percentage points 
respectively. Being married made the individuals more likely to disagree with this 
statement by 2.4 percentage points.  
Being male, unemployed or having more people in the household were all more 
likely to be associated with thinking there exists strong conflicts between the rich 
and poor (2.6, 1.2 and .6 percentage points respectively), while being married or 
de facto made individuals less likely to believe strong conflicts exist by 1.6 
percentage points.  
These results suggest demographic differences may in fact be driving some of the 
differences in attitudes. Individuals who were older, unemployed or male were 
significant demographic factors in two thirds of the questions regarding inequality, 
while being married or de facto and the number of people in the household were 
significant in just over half of the questions. Finally, the number of years an 
individual spent in education was the least significant variable and only affected 










6.10 Marginal Effects – Strongly Disagree 
 
Table 6.6  




Age  Male 
Years in 
Education 
Married or De 
Facto 
Number of People in 
HH 
Unemployed 
Diff in Y too large ● ○ ○ ● 
  
○ 
Govt. Responsibility to reduce differences in 
Y ● ○ ○ 
 
● ○ ○ 
        Inequality 
       Type of society today ● ○ ○ 
 
● ○ ○ 
Type ought to be ● ○ 
    
○ 
        Opinion -Higher incomes can afford better  
       Education ○ ○ 
   
○ 






        Educations importance for pay  ● ○ ○ 
   
○ 




● ○ ○ 






Notes: ●=significance at any level above 10% which was positively associated with strong disagreement.  
○=significance at any level above 10% which was negatively associated with strong disagreement. 
Source: ISSP data surveys 1999 and 2009. 
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Re-estimating the marginal effects at the opposite end of the Likert scale can 
identify if any specific characteristics were associated with strong disagreement 
with the above inequality based statements using equation 6.9. 
Comparing strong disagreement with strong agreement can identify if any factors 
which were associated negatively with strong agreement were in fact because it 
was associated positively with strong disagreement, rather than indifference. 
Table 6.6 summarizes the significant demographic factors associated positively or 
negatively with strong agreement to the following inequality statements. 
The dummy variable representing the difference between the 1999 and 2009 
respondents was significant for all the questions regarding inequality at a 95% 
confidence level. This shows that individuals in 2009 were more likely to strongly 
disagree with the following statements: 
 Differences in income are too large 
 It is the Government’s responsibility to reduce differences in income  
 The type of society we live in today should be one with a small elite at the 
top, very few people in the middle and the great mass of people at the 
bottom 
 We ought to live in a society with a small elite at the top, very few people 
in the middle and the great mass of people at the bottom 
 Education is important for pay  
 There exists conflicts between rich and poor individuals 
 Their own individual pay is just  
And less likely to strongly disagree that: 
 Those on higher incomes should be able to afford better education and 
health 
These results confirm that the attitudes of individuals in 2009 were less likely to 
support the introduction of the blanket subsidy on student loans in 2006. It is also 
interesting to identify if any demographic factors are more likely to influence an 
individual’s decision to strongly disagree with the aforementioned inequality 
statements. Significant demographic differences associated with each statement 
are presented in the next section.  
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6.10.1. Demographic differences – strongly disagree 
 
When respondents were asked if they believed differences in incomes were too 
large at present, individuals who were male or unemployed were less likely to 
strongly disagree with this statement by 0.8 and 0.2 percentage points respectively. 
While being married or de facto made an individual more likely to strongly agree 
by 0.2 percentage points.  
In response to the question “is it the Government’s responsibility to reduce 
differences in income?”, being male, unemployed or having more people in the 
household were less likely to strongly disagree with this responsibility by 2.2, 2.0 
and 1 percentage points respectively while being married increased the likelihood 
of strongly disagreeing with this statement by 1 percentage point.  
Respondents were asked what type of society they believed they lived in today 
based on a range of 5 indices. Individuals who were older, unemployed, or male 
were less likely to strongly disagree that they live in a society where there are 
many people at the top and only a few at the bottom by 0.2, 0.2 and 0.3 
percentage points respectively, while being married made an individual more 
likely to strong disagree by 0.5 percentage points. When asked what society they 
thought it ought to live in, being male made the individual 1 percentage point 
more likely to want this type of society while being unemployed made individuals 
more likely by 1 percentage point not to want this type of society.  
When asked if those on higher incomes should be able to afford better education 
older individuals and individuals with a higher number of people in their 
household were less likely to strongly disagree with this statement by 1 
percentage point. A similar question asked individuals if they believed those on 
higher incomes should be able to afford better healthcare. Results showed that 
being male decreased the likelihood of strongly disagreeing by 2 percentage 
points and being unemployed or having a higher number of people in the 
household also decreased the likelihood by 1 percentage point while being 
married increased the likelihood by 1 percentage point. 
When individuals were asked if they believed that no strong conflicts existed in 
society, being male or unemployed decreased the likelihood of strong 
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disagreement by 2 and 1 percentage points respectively. Being married increased 
the likelihood of strong disagreement by 1 percentage point. 
None of the aforementioned characteristics played a role in increasing the 
likelihood of strongly disagreeing that education is important for pay, or in terms 
of agreeing that their own personal pay is much more than is just to a significant 
effect. Interestingly, only 0.5% and 0.8% of individuals respectively in this survey 
voted for these options which suggests the majority of the sample believe 
education is important in determining pay and they do not strongly disagree that 
their pay is much more than just.  
The demographic factors associated with strong disagreement were very similar, 
but in different directions to those associated with strong agreement. This is not 
surprising as it simply eliminates the possibility that individuals were indifferent 
to the statement rather than holding the opposing view. There was one exception 
to this with unemployed individuals being more likely not to want to live in a 
society with many people near the top, and only a few near the bottom. Yet they 
were not significantly associated with wanting an oppositely distributed society 
where a small number of elite are at the top, very few people in the middle, and 
the great mass of people at the bottom. 
 
6.11 Decomposing Effects  
These significant demographic effects can be decomposed further to identify if 
certain types within each of the demographic variables are driving the significant 
result. For example, education was a significant variable in two of the nine 
questions asked and it is possible to identify if individuals with similar 
educational attainment are driving this significance. Both education and age will 




Education was a demographic variable which appeared to play a significant role 
when individuals were asked if they believed differences in incomes were too 
large and if they believed their own pay was just. Education was decomposed into 
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six categories            : no formal qualification, lowest formal qualification 
(NCEA level 1), above lowest qualification (NCEA level 2), higher secondary 
qualification (NCEA level 3), above secondary qualification (trade and vocational 
training) and university qualifications. An ordered probit and marginal effects 
model was then used to identify if any type of education was driving the 
significant result.  
Results showed that when individuals were asked if they believed differences in 
income were too large it was those who either had the lowest formal education 
      or just above this qualification       that were more likely to strongly 
agree with this statement. Having an education equivalent to this in 1999 made the 
respondents more than 16 percentage points more likely to strongly agree 
differences in income are too large. Education was also a significant variable in 
terms of whether individuals believed their own pay was just. However, this 
significance appears not to be driven by a specific group of individuals with 




The analysis above also highlighted that age is likely to play a role in defining 
whether an individual is likely to strongly agree with a statement regarding 
inequality. Excluding the inequality questions regarding health, conflict, and 
whether or not they believed their own pay was just, age significantly affected the 
remaining questions regarding inequality. These effects were also decomposed 
using an ordered probit model and marginal effects calculations. Age was split 
into 8 categories             .  
Results revealed age was a significant characteristic when individuals were asked 
if, in their opinion, they strongly agreed differences in income are too large. 
Decomposing this shows this significance is primarily coming from those aged 35 
to 44      in 1999. The age interval up to 17 was omitted for both groups as no 
participants meet this criterion, while the interval 75 to 98 was omitted to avoid 
multicollinearity effects.   
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Surprisingly, the marginal probit results show those aged 35 to 44 in 1999 were 
actually 11.9 percentage points more likely to not strongly agree that differences 
in income are too large. This contradicts the marginal effect above which had a 
positive marginal value prior to age being split into intervals.  
Interestingly, age was a significant variable when individuals were asked if they 
believed it was the Government’s responsibility to reduce differences in income, 
however when split into age intervals only the age group 35 to 44 years old 
      was significant at a 90% confidence interval. When individuals were 
asked what type of society they believed they lived in today, no specific age 
interval is driving the previous significant results. Quite a different story is 
evident when individuals were asked what type of society they thought they ought 
to live in. All ages from 18 to 64                were highly significant in 
1999 (p<0.01) whereas, only one age group (55-64,      was significant in 




Attitudes towards inequality in New Zealand have significantly changed between 
1999 and 2009. One particularly interesting result is that individuals in 2009 are 
more likely to disagree that it is the government’s responsibility to intervene in 
order to reduce differences in income. Further, individuals in 2009 were also more 
likely to agree that those on a higher income should be able to afford better 
education. These types of results do not support the profound subsidisation of 
tertiary education through the blanket subsidy on interest which was introduced in 
2006.  
Individuals’ in 2009 did however, still desire a society with less inequality, or a 
society characterised by a larger proportion of individuals in the middle or top of 
the distribution, and less in the bottom. This result was also true of individuals’ in 
1999, and suggests that individuals in both 1999 and 2009 are likely to support 
policies which are aimed at reducing inequality. Opinions regarding the current 
state of inequality present in society revealed individuals in 2009 believed they 
lived in a society with greater equality than those in 1999.  
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Demographic differences in 1999 and 2009 also played a significant role in 
individuals’ attitudes towards questions regarding inequality. Individuals who 
were older, unemployed, male, or who had higher numbers of people in their 
household were all factors which were positively associated with strong 
agreement to the above statements. This suggests individuals with these 
characteristics are the most likely to support polices ratifying inequality and 
































The surprising decision from the Labour Government in 2006, to eliminate all 
interest from student loans, for borrowers choosing to reside in New Zealand, was 
controversial. It was the first time a government had moved from a full market 
interest rate to a zero nominal rate of interest on student loans. Investigation into 
the potential impacts of this type of policy had previously been restricted to 
theoretical research, which predicted that the consequent non-price rationing of 
scarce educational resources, and the income-contingent repayments structure 
would benefit wealthier borrowers over time, exacerbating inequality.   
This thesis offered the first chance to reconcile theory with empirics by examining 
changes in the student loan scheme policy, with a particular focus on interest rates. 
These results have been placed against a background of changing public attitude 
to inequality, and provided some evidence on possible consequences for 
beneficiaries. Within this chapter a brief conclusion from Chapters 5 and 6 will be 
presented before summarising the limitations and highlighting areas for future 
research.  
 
7.2 Distributional Impacts  
 
Income data collected from the NZIS was used to examine general trends in 
inequality from 2002-2007. This analysis neither revealed evidence, across a 
range of income and inequality measures, in full support of theoretical predictions, 
 100 
 
nor did this analysis substantiate the Labour Government’s predictions of greater 
equality convincing. A large variation in inequality measures occurred, which 
suggests that further investigation is warranted.  
The subgroup of likely student loan holders had higher recorded weekly income 
values on average when compared to the total population, which suggests the 
private returns to education are significant. Further, results from propensity score 
and Kernel matching techniques indicated individuals who were likely student 
loan holders were already characteristically more likely to earn more later in their 
working lifetime. These results show that paying a significant subsidy towards 
this group may in fact be inefficient.   
 
7.3 Attitudes  
 
Evidence from the studying of attitudes towards inequality from 1999 and 2009 
showed a significant change has occurred within this timeframe. Individuals in 
2009 were more likely to disagree that it is the government’s responsibility to 
intervene in order to reduce differences in income, and agree that those on a 
higher income should be able to afford better education. These results do not 
correspond with the high level of subsidisation associated with the zero interest 
policy on student loans introduced in 2006.  
In addition to comparing opinions across the two years, demographic 
characteristics that are associated with supporting government intervention and 
placing greater importance on education were investigated. Interestingly, these 
characteristics included being male, older, or unemployed, which are not 
characteristics associated with being a student loan holder. This suggests reducing 
educational inequality is not an issue solely concerning individuals who are, in 






7.4 Future Research  
 
This thesis provides general conclusions regarding inequality, incomes, and 
attitudes, for both the total population and a subgroup of likely student loan 
holders, before and after the introduction of the blanket interest subsidy on student 
loans in 2006. More specific conclusions, particularly the explicit testing of the 
theoretical predictions of introducing a blanket interest subsidy, require more 
specialised data.  
Literature theorising on the implications of introducing a blanket interest subsidy 
attribute a potential increase in inequality to two factors. Firstly, the consequent 
non-price rationing of scarce educational resources and, secondly, in the case of 
income-contingent repayments, the benefit accrues to wealthier borrowers. 
Optimal testing of the implications of adopting a non-price rationing enrolment 
system would employ enrolment data, while up-to-date longitudinal data would be 
most appropriate for investigating the potential impacts of an income-contingent 
repayment scheme. These present gaps for future research to exploit.  
Additionally, future studies incorporating a longer time frame could extend this 
research by identifying more recent trends, and changes to borrower’s behaviour, 
over the entire seven years since the policy’s implementation. This would also 
allow investigation into trends which have occurred for borrowers who started 
borrowing post 2006 and whose loans have never borne a market rate of interest.  
This thesis is the inaugural empirical investigation into the removal of interest on 
student loans, a policy with potentially profound and wide-reaching implications 
for inequality. This policy has been implemented for several years and yet we 
know little of its effects. As outlined above, there are several areas in which future 
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Appendix 1 - Likert Scale 
 
1 Strongly agree 
2 Agree 
3 Neither agree nor disagree 
4 Disagree 
5 Strongly disagree 
8 Can't choose 
9 No answer 
(Any answer of 8 or 9 was excluded from descriptive statistics) 
 
Appendix 2 - Inequality Scale 
 
Mean response of participants to the question: “What do you think New Zealand 
ought to be like – which would you prefer? 
1: Type A: A small elite at the top, very few people in the middle and the great 
mass of people at the bottom. 
2: Type B: A society like a pyramid with a small elite at the top, more people in 
the middle and the most at the bottom. 
3: Type C: A pyramid except that just a few people are at the bottom. 
4: Type D: A society with most people in the middle. 





Appendix 3 - Demographic Questions 
 
Mean response of participants to the question: “Just or unjust – that people with 
higher incomes can buy better health care than people with lower incomes? 
1 Very just, definitely right 
2 Somewhat just, right 
3 Neither just nor unjust, mixed feelings 
4 Somewhat unjust, wrong 
5 Very unjust, definitely wrong 
8 Can't choose 








Appendix 4 – Difference in Means 
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Appendix 6 – Percentage of Population with Student 
Loans 
 








Trinh's Regression Log Files 
. reg     has_sloan female i.ethnic i.edu age age2 if wave==8 & age>=25 & age<=45
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    3688
       Model |  40.1917582    10  4.01917582           Prob > F      =  0.0000
    Residual |  369.165888  3677  .100398664           R-squared     =  0.0982
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0957
       Total |  409.357646  3687  .111027298           Root MSE      =  .31686
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   has_sloan |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
      female |   .0702225   .0106096     6.62   0.000     .0494211    .0910239
             |
      ethnic |
          2  |   .1055976   .0175265     6.03   0.000     .0712349    .1399603
          3  |   .0483098   .0268691     1.80   0.072    -.0043701    .1009897
          4  |   .0248926   .0233859     1.06   0.287    -.0209579    .0707432
          5  |   .0295667   .0452681     0.65   0.514    -.0591864    .1183198
             |
         edu |
          2  |   .0027571   .0187992     0.15   0.883    -.0341007     .039615
          3  |   .0712893   .0177484     4.02   0.000     .0364917    .1060869
          4  |   .1630313   .0192489     8.47   0.000     .1252917    .2007709
             |
         age |  -.1202466   .0246842    -4.87   0.000    -.1686427   -.0718505
        age2 |   .0013733    .000321     4.28   0.000      .000744    .0020025
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Appendix 7 – CDF Functions (2002-2007) 
 
 
  
  
  
 
